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DO COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS BENEFIT 
COMMUNITIES? 
Edward W. De Barbieri† 
Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) campaigns and public discussions 
about community benefits are becoming the norm in deciding how large urban 
projects are built outside of formal public land use approvals. CBAs have 
revolutionized land use approvals for large, public-private economic development 
projects: now developers and coalitions representing low-income communities can 
settle their disputes before formal project approval. As a result, CBAs are now 
commonplace nationwide. 
Legal scholarship, however, has failed to keep up with these important 
developments. This Article aims to do just that by examining how CBAs, when 
properly negotiated, lower transaction costs, enhance civic participation, and protect 
taxpayers. It argues that CBAs achieve all these outcomes well, and more efficiently 
than existing government processes. Indeed, this Article’s central argument is that to 
the extent that scholars have analyzed CBAs, their analyses have gone astray by 
either dismissing CBAs as harmful to communities or by focusing on the role of the 
state in negotiating what really should be a private contract between a coalition of 
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community groups and a developer. It is a mistake to give the state’s role in CBAs 
primacy over the community coalition because the inclusion of government in the 
CBA bargaining process creates a host of constitutional protections for developers—
namely that the community benefits must be connected to and proportional with the 
instant government approval. 
This Article places focus back on CBAs as private contracts enforceable by 
inclusive and representative community coalitions. It presents a case study of a 
successful CBA negotiated for the development of the Kingsbridge National Ice 
Center in the Bronx. This Article proposes a framework for assessing the impact of 
CBAs in economic development—one that recognizes the nuanced role that states 
and municipalities play in the formation and enforcement of CBAs. The framework 
focuses on the extent to which CBAs (1) lower transaction costs by effectively 
resolving disputes among developers and community groups, (2) increase civic 
participation in public processes, (3) protect taxpayers, and (4) avoid government 
intervention and constitutional protections for developers. This Article concludes 
with recommendations for the appropriate, limited role of government in CBA 
negotiations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today it is commonplace for developers to routinely negotiate and 
provide economic benefits such as affordable housing, local hiring, and 
living wages to communities where major developments are located.1 In 
practice, large developers bidding on economic development projects 
deploy lobbyists to negotiate agreements with local opposition groups 
and to win lucrative rights to build.2 Community Benefits Agreements 
(CBAs) are contracts between developers and a representative coalition 
of community organizations.3 The coalition exchanges public and 
political support of a proposed development project for a slate of 
economic benefits.4 CBAs are now the standard practice for developers 
and community groups to resolve disputes surrounding large 
developments in many cities and towns across the country.5 
 
 1 Christine A. Fazio & Judith Wallace, Essay, Legal and Policy Issues Related to Community 
Benefits Agreements, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 543, 544 (2010). Recently, CBAs have been 
characterized as a type of "impact transaction"—referring to transactions for the public good, 
similar to impact litigation that have the potential for effecting large scale social change. 
Patience A. Crowder, Impact Transaction: Lawyering for the Public Good Through Collective 
Impact Agreements, 49 IND. L. REV. 621, 630 (2016). 
 2 Lobbying at the local level is big business. Lobbyists with connections to elected officials, 
including mayors or city council members, do especially well. The top ten lobbyists in New 
York City, for example, reported compensation of almost seventy-two million dollars in 2014. 
One firm that supported Mayor Bill de Blasio’s recent mayoral campaign reported earnings of 
$8.2 million in 2014 (the year de Blasio was elected), up $4.6 million from 2013. LOBBYING 
BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2015), http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/
downloads/pdf/2014%20annual%20227%20Final%202.pdf; LOBBYING BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE 
CITY CLERK, ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2014), http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/downloads/pdf/
LobbyingAnnualReport2014.pdf. 
 3 Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies, PARTNERSHIP FOR 
WORKING FAMILIES, http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/policy-tools-community-
benefits-agreements-and-policies (last visited July 28, 2015). 
 4 JULIAN GROSS WITH GREG LEROY & MADELINE JANIS-APARICIO, GOOD JOBS FIRST & 
CAL. P’SHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 10–11 (2005), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/
default/files/docs/pdf/cba2005final.pdf. 
 5 Terry Pristin, In Major Projects, Agreeing Not to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at 
C6. One study highlighted twenty-seven CBAs in place nationwide. Laura Wolf-Powers, 
Community Benefits Agreements and Local Government: A Review of Recent Evidence, 76 J. AM. 
PLAN. ASS’N 141 (2010) [hereinafter Wolf-Powers, CBAs and Local Government]. Another 
study highlighted CBAs, not just in California and New York City, but also in upstate New 
York, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Charleston, Miami, Milwaukee, Seattle, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and 
Wilmington, as well as internationally in Toronto and Dublin. Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, 
Understanding Community Benefits Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and 
Other Considerations for Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 291, 318 (2008) [hereinafter Salkin & Lavine, Understanding Community 
Benefits Agreements]. 
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Although some scholars have written about CBAs, the scholarship 
has not kept up with the rapid increase in implementation of CBAs.6 
Scholars who do analyze CBAs either dismiss them as harmful to 
community interests,7 or focus their attention on the state’s involvement 
in negotiations and enforcement.8 In contrast, this Article shines a 
spotlight on the benefits of CBAs, presenting a framework for how and 
when they can be beneficial, and argues, counter to some, that state 
involvement is actually undesirable. When done properly, CBAs can 
and do benefit communities. 
Three recent development projects illuminate the wide variety of 
current arrangements through which developers attempt to distribute 
community economic benefits: 
• In Chicago, community groups are calling for a CBA at the $600 
million Obama Presidential Center,9 yet Barack Obama 
Foundation representatives have not embraced a CBA thus far, 
arguing that smart and sustainable growth and anchoring public 
and private investment in the community is already key to the 
Center’s location on the South Side.10 
• In Atlanta in 2013, the City Council approved a community 
benefits “plan”11—not a binding CBA with a community 
 
 6 Some have even disputed that CBA use is widespread. See, e.g., Daniel P. Selmi, The 
Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 591, 642 (2011). 
 7 See, e.g., Fazio & Wallace, supra note 1, at 548 (arguing the limitations of CBAs in 
benefiting communities, citing the example of the Atlantic Yards CBA and how it failed to 
prevent litigation from community groups challenging various aspects of the project). 
 8 See, e.g., Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or 
Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 31–35 (2010) (arguing that 
local government should not consider CBAs in land use approvals, or in the alternative if local 
government does consider CBAs in land use approvals, any review should ensure that CBA 
terms have a nexus to land use concerns, are transparent, representative, accountable, address 
citywide concerns, and are enforceable). 
 9 Dahleen Glanton, Obama Library Raises Hopes, Fears About Economic Boom on South 
Side, CHI. TRIB. (May 11, 2015, 5:01 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-obama-
library-economics-20150511-story.html#page=1. In partnership with the University of Chicago, 
a presidential library and museum is planned on the South Side of Chicago, and additional 
programs are planned for the campus of Columbia University in New York City, as well as in 
Honolulu, Hawaii, and in connection with the University of Illinois. Official Announcement, 
Obama Found., Obama Presidential Center Coming to Chicago (May 12, 2015), http://
www.barackobamafoundation.org/announcements. 
 10 Glanton, supra note 9. Often developers claim that their development itself provides 
economic benefits in the form of tax revenue to the local government, jobs, and the elimination 
of blight; however, this claim belies the nature of CBAs as being separate and apart from 
general economic benefits related to development. See GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, 
supra note 4, at 3–4. 
 11 Dion Rabouin, City Council Unanimously Approves Benefits Plan for Communities 
Around New Falcons Stadium, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD (Dec. 3, 2013), http://
atlantadailyworld.com/2013/12/03/city-council-unanimously-approves-benefits-plan-for-
communities-around-new-falcons-stadium; see also Atlanta Falcons Community-Benefits Plan, 
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coalition—seeded with fifteen million dollars from The Arthur M. 
Blank Family Foundation,12 and a second fifteen million dollars 
from the city’s economic development authority,13 despite calls 
from community leaders for a CBA14 surrounding the 
development of a new Atlanta Falcons stadium.15 
• In Maine, Somerset County Commissioners recently approved a 
wind farm tax abatement district after the developer agreed to pay 
an annual per-turbine fee for the next twenty years as part of a 
“community benefit agreement.”16 The funds may be spent in any 
manner directed by commissioners anywhere in the county.17 
In none of these three examples is there an enforceable CBA with 
community organizations to help guide the distribution of economic 
benefits. An enforceable CBA, negotiated with an inclusive, 
representative, and accountable coalition is key to how CBAs benefit 
communities. In contrast to the examples from Chicago, Atlanta, and 
Maine, Part II of this Article presents an example of a CBA where a 
community has a contractual role in distributing benefits negotiated 
around a significant economic development project. 
The Kingsbridge National Ice Center CBA is the first “credible” 
CBA in New York City,18 negotiated by the city’s first inclusive 
 
SCRIBD., https://www.scribd.com/doc/188765618/Atlanta-Falcons-Community-Benefits-Plan 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2015). 
 12 Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund Background, ARTHUR M. BLANK FAM. FOUND., 
http://www.blankfoundation.org/westside-fund-background (last visited July 29, 2015). Arthur 
M. Blank is the cofounder of Atlanta-based home improvement retailer The Home Depot. 
Arthur Blank, Chairman, ARTHUR M. BLANK FAM. FOUND., http://blankfoundation.org/arthur-
blank (last visited July 24, 2015). 
 13 Press Release, Invest Atlanta, Invest Atlanta Announces Application Process for Westside 
Tax Allocation District Community Improvement Fund (Jan. 13, 2014), http://
investatlanta.com/wp-content/uploads/Invest-Atlanta-Announces-Application-Process-for-
Westside-Tax-Allocation-District-Community-Improvement-Fund-FINAL.pdf. 
 14 Equality Atlanta, Making the Case for Vine City and English Avenue, YOUTUBE (Nov. 14, 
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=StSY5HRorpA. 
 15 Fast Facts: Mercedes-Benz Stadium by the Numbers, MERCEDES-BENZ STADIUM, http://
mercedesbenzstadium.com/stadium-info/fast-facts (last visited Mar. 1, 2016). 
 16 Community Benefit Agreement Between the County of Somerset, Maine, and Blue Sky 
West, LLC (Dec. 22, 2014) (on file with author); Rachel Ohm, Somerset County Approves Wind 
Farm TIF District, CENTRALMAINE.COM (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.centralmaine.com/2014/
12/22/somerset-county-approves-wind-farm-tif-district. The county approved a tax increment 
financing, or TIF, district, which would allow both the county to collect a portion of future 
property tax increases and First Wind to pay less future property taxes. Id. 
 17 Ohm, supra note 16. 
 18 Press Release, Josh Epstein, DLA Piper, DLA Piper and Urban Justice Center 
Congratulate the Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance on Their Historic Community 
Benefits Agreement (Apr. 23, 2013) [hereinafter DLA Piper Press Release], http://
www.dlapiperprobono.com/news/latest-news/2013/kingsbridge-armory-redevelopment-
alliance.html. 
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grassroots CBA coalition.19 The case study of the Kingsbridge National 
Ice Center CBA provides analysis and lessons learned that can be useful 
in negotiating CBAs around other major developments. The case study 
illustrates with particularity exactly when and how a CBA can benefit a 
specific community. 
In Part III, this Article proposes a framework for assessing the 
impact of CBAs on economic development. The framework focuses on 
the extent to which CBAs (1) lower transaction costs by effectively 
resolving disputes among developers and community groups, (2) 
increase civic participation in public processes, (3) protect taxpayers by 
holding developers to the commitments they make, and (4) avoid 
government regulation and constitutional protections for developers. 
Not only are CBAs a welcome addition to local public land use review 
processes, they are becoming the norm for how developers and 
communities settle disputes. 
I.     CBAS EMERGE IN LAND USE LAW 
The notion of “citizen participation in public decision-making is a 
‘little like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle because it is 
good for you.’”20 The problem of civic participation in the CBA context 
is how to achieve a community coalition bargaining team that is 
representative of a variety of community interests. CBA scholarship in 
support of CBAs highlights the flexibility of CBAs to reach terms that 
agreements between developers and the government cannot. Scholars 
who highlight the challenges of CBAs talk about the problem of 
obtaining an inclusive coalition. 
This Part advances the argument that CBAs are the law outside of 
the law for public land use decision in two ways: First, scholars have 
looked at CBAs the wrong way. Specifically, agreements that do not 
involve an inclusive coalition obviously are likely to fail. These 
agreements should not be called CBAs. Second, it is possible for a 
community coalition to have an inclusive, representative, and 
accountable negotiating team. Instances of these types of coalitions exist 
throughout the literature. In Part II, this Article presents a case study of 
a precedent setting CBA involving an inclusive community coalition. 
 
 19 Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Community Benefits Agreements and Comprehensive 
Planning: Balancing Community Empowerment and the Police Power, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 157, 210 
(2009) [hereinafter Salkin & Lavine, Balancing Community Empowerment]. 
 20 Thomas A. Musil, The Sleeping Giant: Community Benefit Agreements and Urban 
Development, 44 URB. LAW. 827, 829 (2012) (quoting Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen 
Participation, 35 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 216 (1969)). 
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This Part begins with a discussion of CBAs in the legal academic 
literature. It then describes CBA origins as an outgrowth of community 
organizing campaigns. Next, it discusses how CBAs are formed and how 
they work. 
Arguments in the literature in support of CBAs are introduced, 
focusing on the use of CBAs to bring living wage jobs to local workers. 
Then, arguments in the literature against the use of CBAs are discussed, 
centering on claims of extortion by community groups, lack of 
representation of the community groups themselves, and the likelihood 
for government corruption and insider dealing. 
A.     CBAs and Land Use Scholarship 
The first CBAs were negotiated in Los Angeles around fifteen years 
ago.21 They arose out of local hiring and living wage campaigns led by 
nonprofit community organizing groups.22 CBAs revolutionized land 
use approvals for economic development projects since, for the first 
time, developers and coalitions representing low-income communities 
settled their disputes about specific projects before the projects were 
approved.23 
Although CBAs are prevalent nationwide,24 the term CBA has 
expanded to include agreements where local government officials 
replace the coalition as the negotiating party.25 Although it may seem 
counterintuitive, the inclusion of government in the CBA bargaining 
process creates a host of constitutional protections for developers.26 
Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, these protections limit 
the scope of what developers can exchange for a public land use 
approval.27 Perhaps as a result, scholars in the legal academic literature 
have recently focused on the role of the state in negotiating what really 
 
 21 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 14–19; Salkin & Lavine, 
Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 5, at 301–07. 
 22 Salkin & Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 5, at 301; 
Lee Romney, Community, Developers Agree on Staples Plan, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2001, at A1. 
 23 For a visual diagram showing the altering of contractual relationships between the 
developer, various community groups, and government, see GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-
APARICIO, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
 24 See supra note 5. 
 25 Currently, scholars use the term CBA to refer to both private contracts and contracts 
involving government. Wolf-Powers, CBAs and Local Government, supra note 5, at 141. 
 26 Been, supra note 8, at 19 (arguing that CBAs may allow municipalities to bypass 
constitutional protections that come with government involvement in land use regulation). 
 27 Id. at 13–14. 
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should be a private contract between a coalition of community groups 
and a developer.28 
The existing literature misses the point about CBAs. The 
scholarship has not kept up with their rapid development and fails to 
accurately assess the importance of the CBA movement in influencing 
economic development. CBAs deserve greater attention because they 
operate largely outside of what is written in the law of public land use. 
They should be celebrated, not shunned merely because there are no 
standardized CBA laws enacted.29 CBAs are emerging as an extra-legal 
way to facilitate public land use approvals and are altering how 
developments are negotiated. 
If it is true, as scholars have recently observed, that public land use 
debates are stale,30 perhaps a renewed emphasis on CBAs will freshen up 
the conversation. By settling disputes prelitigation, properly negotiated 
CBAs may actually lower transaction costs for developers. CBAs bring 
an added certainty of securing project approval31 that benefits 
developers when they approach investors and lenders in the capital 
markets and protects the developers’ investment. CBAs are effective 
when (1) the community coalition is inclusive of, representative of, and 
accountable to a spectrum of community interests; and (2) the 
government is not a party.32 
Leading scholars have argued that policymakers and economists 
tend to overestimate the benefits of government regulation.33 CBA 
negotiations function as a Coasean bargain between private parties,34 
where developers and community groups attempt to arrive at an 
agreeable value for the development of a particular project. Ronald 
Coase pointed out that efficient bargains that may occur when 
transaction costs are low will be prevented when transaction costs are 
high.35 While the upfront costs of negotiating a CBA are typically high 
 
 28 Id. at 18–19. 
 29 The City of Detroit is considering a local ordinance requiring CBAs for projects above a 
certain size. See infra Section I.F. Other examples include the Maine wind farm statute, see 
discussion supra Introduction, the report on Public Benefits Agreements to NYC Comptroller 
John C. Liu, see discussion infra Section I.F, and the Washington, D.C., Planned Unit 
Development (PUD) law. See discussion infra Section I.C. 
 30 See, e.g., David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 (2013). 
 31 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 10. 
 32 Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Legal 
Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 35, 39–40 (2008) 
[hereinafter Gross, Community Benefits Agreements]. 
 33 See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1960). 
 34 Laura Wolf-Powers, Community Benefits Agreements in a Value Capture Context, in 
VALUE CAPTURE AND LAND POLICIES 217, 218 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds., 
2012) [hereinafter Wolf-Powers, Value Capture]. 
 35 Coase, supra note 33, at 15–16. 
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in terms of organizing and working with lawyers, over time, the costs of 
a well-settled agreement may be less than the costs of prolonged 
litigation. 
Scholars often cite failed CBAs, or agreements that should not be 
called CBAs, to support arguments for why CBAs are too costly to 
negotiate.36 Generally, scholars mistakenly refer to agreements 
negotiated by noninclusive coalitions as CBAs; rather, they use the term 
CBA to describe agreements involving only a few groups that do not 
comprise an inclusive coalition of representative interests.37 This Article 
argues that CBAs should refer only to a limited category of agreements 
entered into between a developer and a coalition of community groups 
concerning a single development because they are truly unique 
contracts in their ability to achieve terms that rarely occur elsewhere in 
land use law.38 
In addition to lowering transaction costs and bargaining outside 
government regulation, CBAs have the power to bring more dense 
development to cities. Density, some argue, is the reason cities are more 
productive than other areas.39 Yet, as Ryan Avent writes, many cities are 
losing competitiveness because of a lack of affordable housing and 
stifling government regulation.40 CBAs can help development move 
forward in a way that encourages the growth of productive urban cores 
by resolving conflict and facilitating bargains that public processes do 
not facilitate. CBAs may also have a role to play in managing 
development in rural areas, such as in parts of Maine and in other 
locations, as discussed in the Section below. 
 
 36 See, e.g., Lance Freeman, Atlantic Yards and the Perils of Community Benefit Agreements, 
PLANETIZEN: BLOG (May 7, 2007, 5:00 AM), https://www.planetizen.com/node/24335 
(criticizing the Atlantic Yards CBA in downtown Brooklyn). However, the Atlantic Yards CBA 
had no mechanism to ensure the community was represented in the agreement. See id. 
 37 See, e.g., Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies, supra note 3 
(defining a CBA as a project-specific agreement where a developer and a broad coalition of 
community groups exchange community contributions for project support). Julian Gross, a 
leading CBA practitioner and author, argues that only standalone agreements between 
community groups and developers should be termed CBAs, since they (1) can be enforced by 
the affected community stakeholders, and (2) are private contracts. Julian Gross, Commentary 
on Community Benefits Agreements in a Value Capture Context, in VALUE CAPTURE AND LAND 
POLICY 229, 230–31 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2012) [hereinafter Gross, 
Commentary]. Laura Wolf-Powers, a leading CBA scholar, more broadly defines CBAs as “a set 
of programmatic and material commitments that a private developer has made to win public 
support from” area residents and other stakeholders. Wolf-Powers, Value Capture, supra note 
34, at 218; Wolf-Powers, CBAs and Local Government, supra note 5. 
 38 See Gross, Commentary, supra note 37, at 229–30. 
 39 See, e.g., Ryan Avent, Opinion, One Path to Better Jobs: More Density in Cities, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/opinion/sunday/one-path-to-
better-jobs-more-density-in-cities.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 40 RYAN AVENT, THE GATED CITY ch. 1 (2011). 
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CBAs are not without challenges. Potential downsides range from 
unenforceability,41 to trouble organizing the coalition,42 to claims of 
extortion.43 Nevertheless, CBAs continue to have a far-reaching impact 
on development projects nationally. 
B.     Community Organizers Develop CBA Campaigns 
The movement to organize for CBAs is founded in progressive 
political action. Specifically, CBA campaigns come out of a community 
organizing tradition that disrupts power and the relations of power in a 
local community. CBA campaigns through contract law principals are 
intrinsically connected to community economic development (CED) 
law. 
CED lawyering emerged in the 1990s as the dominant form of 
poverty alleviation as a market-based response to traditional entitlement 
programs.44 Scott Cummings has argued for a new approach to CED 
practice that reconnects to its politically activist roots by deploying 
transactional lawyering in support of strategies such as living wage 
campaigns, worker ownership drives, and organizing-based jobs 
initiatives.45 CBA campaigns are an example of this alternative CED 
practice, in that CBAs often include terms regarding living wage, local 
hiring preferences, and other benefits for low-income workers and 
tenants. 
Coalitions of grassroots activists and lawyers, spurred on by 
successes in the movement to increase living wages, began using local 
business subsidies to direct economic benefits to low-income 
communities.46 This led to the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for 
Economic Justice in Los Angeles winning a community benefits plan 
 
 41 Been, supra note 8, at 27–28. 
 42 Salkin & Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 5, at 320. 
 43 Pristin, supra note 5 (quoting New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg as saying that 
development projects will not be an opportunity “for everybody else that wants to grab 
something”). 
 44 Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a 
Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 400 (2001). One significant 
shift in antipoverty programs to CED was the 1999 New Markets Tax Credits initiative, where 
the Clinton Administration pledged over one billion dollars in tax breaks and loan assistance to 
businesses in poor areas. Id. at 399 n.1. Scholars have observed that this new wave of market-
based CED policy has largely failed to alleviate poverty; for instance, market-based CED has 
mostly facilitated public financing of low-wage, dead-end jobs. Id. at 407–08. 
 45 Id. at 408–09. 
 46 Id. at 479. 
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surrounding the billion dollar development of the L.A. Live sports and 
entertainment complex.47 
As has been discussed in the literature, the first step in a CBA 
campaign is organizing the coalition.48 Additional steps include building 
support among elected officials, educating the press and the public, and 
negotiating with developers.49 A developer’s self-interest in a CBA 
negotiation stems from a developer’s need for public support for a 
subsidy or particular government approval.50 
It is key for a CBA coalition to be representative of as many of the 
varying community interests surrounding the project as possible.51 
Therefore, community organizers need to do what they do best: reach 
out to community participants.52 In certain CBA campaigns where the 
CBA coalition was not representative of differing views in the 
community, such as was the case with Atlantic Yards, CBAs are not 
likely to be accepted or seen as legitimate by the community.53 This 
Article will return to the issue of effectiveness of civic engagement and 
its impact on the success or failure of CBAs and CBA campaigns in later 
Sections. 
C.     How CBAs Work 
Community organizing groups, and the members they organize, 
have limited available mechanisms to influence publically supported 
economic development projects.54 Individuals may testify at land use 
 
 47 Id. at 480. 
 48 See, e.g., Memorandum, David Marcello, Pub. Law Ctr., A “Concentric Circles” Model 
for Organizing Community Benefit Agreements (Mar. 15, 2007) (on file with author). 
 49 Id. 
 50 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 10. 
 51 Gross, Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 32, at 45; Salkin & Lavine, 
Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 5, at 321. 
 52 Salkin & Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 5, at 321. 
Note that in the context of participatory budgeting, a process where citizens vote to award 
public funds to different capital projects—not too dissimilar in some respects from the spirit of 
a CBA campaign—a recent report indicated that outreach to nonwhite participants was key to 
including community members from diverse backgrounds. Linell Ajello, Participatory 




 53 William Ho, Community Benefits Agreements: An Evolution in Public Benefits 
Negotiation Processes, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 7, 28 (2007); Salkin 
& Lavine, Understanding Community Benefit Agreements, supra note 5, at 320. 
 54 Gross, Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 32, at 37–38. 
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approval hearings,55 lobby elected officials,56 or in some cases, use 
litigation strategies to delay or derail project approvals.57 These 
strategies often frustrate the parties involved, and in most cases, limit 
the ability of local residents to meaningfully influence development in 
their neighborhoods.58 As a result, organizers have formed coalitions of 
low-income workers, faith communities, and labor unions to negotiate 
directly with developers to win community economic benefits tied to 
specific projects, furthering equitable development and social justice 
ends.59 
Campaigns to win CBAs on particular projects are part of a 
strategy community organizers can use by leveraging their base of 
members to bring developers to the negotiating table.60 In most cases, 
CBAs are negotiated before a project is approved, and the delivery of 
benefits occurs during and after construction.61 Community organizing 
groups, faith congregations, and unions support CBA campaigns 
because CBAs have the ability to win affordable housing development, 
living wages for local residents, and dedicated space for community 
activities.62 Critics claim that CBAs are outright extortion by politically 
connected, unelected, antidevelopment dissidents.63 
CBA negotiations typically begin when a local government, or a 
developer, proposes a particular economic development project. A CBA 
is formed when the developer makes an agreement with a coalition of 
community organizations who represent groups of people most 
immediately affected by the proposed development. The coalition of 
community groups agree not to oppose the development in exchange 
for a promise from the developer to provide some form of community 
benefit, such as a certain amount of affordable housing, for example.64 
Usually, the CBA is private between the developer and the coalition. 
Recently, some local governments have taken part in CBAs.65 Though, 
 
 55 Id. at 38. 
 56 See Telephone Interview with Alice McIntosh, infra note 134. 
 57 Been, supra note 8, at 19. 
 58 Id. at 15–16. 
 59 See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 60 See discussion infra Section II.A.1. 
 61 See discussion infra Section II.A.3. 
 62 See, e.g., SUSTAINABLE PORT CHESTER ALL., COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT 
BACKGROUND PACKET (2016), http://portchesteralliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
CBA-Background-Packet_Sust-PC-Alliance_Compressed.pdf. 
 63 See discussion infra Section I.E.1. 
 64 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 9–10. 
 65 CBAs involving local governments have been characterized as “public CBAs.” Gross, 
Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 32, at 45. Although, Julian Gross points out in a 
more recent writing that including “public CBAs” in the CBA definition is overly broad and 
that it confuses the unique aspects of a CBA, namely, that it is private and enforceable by 
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as mentioned above, agreements involving government officials make 
community coalitions less relevant in negotiating and enforcing CBA 
terms. Therefore, this Article will define CBAs only as agreements 
between community coalitions and developers. 
The definitional issue is central to forming the argument advanced 
in this Article, namely, that CBAs between community coalitions and 
developers are important because they give local residents key rights in 
enforcing meaningful benefits of public development projects. It is 
important for policymakers to realize that only CBAs involving 
community coalitions should be given any weight in deciding whether 
to approve or deny a particular project. The role of government officials 
in negotiating benefits surrounding development is materially different 
than the role of community groups. Specifically, conditions set by 
government actors must have “nexus” and “rough proportionality” to 
the requested approval.66 CBAs negotiated by community groups do not 
have these same restrictions. Nevertheless, community groups can 
negotiate CBAs alongside government negotiators for separate terms 
that are complimentary in a final project approval. 
The types of benefits agreed upon in CBAs may also often be 
implemented through planned unit developments (PUDs), or 
development agreements.67 PUDs are parcels of land that can be 
developed by a single landowner in a manner that does not directly 
correspond to lot size, bulk, density, lot coverage, type of use, required 
open space, or other typical zoning mandates.68 Development 
agreements, which take different forms in various jurisdictions, can 
contain a series of community benefits commitments. Such 
commitments may also be incorporated into government or agency 
resolutions, or into permits issued as part of land use approval 
processes.69 
 
community groups against a developer. Gross, Commentary, supra note 37, at 229–30. A 2010 
report to New York City Comptroller John C. Liu coined the term “public benefit agreement” 
or “PBA.” TASK FORCE ON PUB. BENEFIT AGREEMENTS, CITY OF N.Y., RECOMMENDATIONS 
(2010), http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/Articles/Community%20Benefits%20Agreements%20Task-
Force-Report-Final.pdf. Use of the term PBA has not yet become commonplace. 
 66 See discussion infra Section III.D.2. 
 67 Several cities, such as Washington, D.C., already have a PUD ordinance in effect, which 
allows developers to create mixed-use communities based upon an officially approved plan. See 
Planned Unit Development Procedures, D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, § 24 (2015); Nicole Stelle 
Garnett, Redeeming Transect Zoning?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 571, 587 n.64 (2013). The PUD 
approval process encourages negotiation between local governments and developers. JULIAN 
CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 
REGULATION LAW 271 (3d ed. 2013). 
 68 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 67, at 261–62. 
 69 Gross, Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 32, at 47. 
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D.     Arguments for CBAs 
CBAs inject, through progressive political action, the ability for 
citizens to engage in negotiations about the land use decisions that affect 
them. Public approval processes for major economic development 
projects typically exclude low income and other vulnerable 
communities.70 However, community economic benefits commitments 
are meaningless unless legally enforceable by the individuals and groups 
that the benefits are intended to reach. Without enforcement, private 
developers receive project approval, and typically, significant taxpayer 
funded subsidies or subsidized land, without ongoing commitments to 
provide the benefits they promised. 
CBAs have the potential to enhance the project approval process 
for public land use. Community groups tend to like CBAs because 
community groups have a greater role in shaping the development 
process. The public impacts of CBA campaigns can be profound with 
respect to increased minimum wages, affordable housing, open spaces, 
and other community benefits. 
1.     Living Wages for Local Workers 
As community organizing campaigns across the country seek to 
increase local minimum wages, CBAs are an important tool in enacting 
higher living wages. As mentioned above, CBA campaigns developed as 
an outgrowth of movements to increase living wages. In some instances, 
CBA campaigns have led to municipality-wide living wage laws.71 A 
 
 70 Been, supra note 8, at 16–17 (discussing complaints by community groups that they have 
less opportunity for input when the local government approval process is preempted by county, 
state, federal, or special authority approval). 
 71  One result of the 2009 Kingsbridge Armory CBA campaign was that the New York City 
Council passed the Fair Wages for New Yorkers Act, which requires developers of certain 
projects receiving at least one million dollars in financial assistance for economic development 
to pay employees a living wage tied to the consumer price index. N.Y.C., N.Y., 
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE tit. 6, § 6-134 (2015). Although the Act passed the Council on April 30, 
2012, it was vetoed by then Mayor Michael Bloomberg, whose veto was overridden by the 
Council on June 28, 2012. See File No. Int. 0251-2010, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, http://
legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=664291&GUID=A83A5A5B-9589-4589-
AAD7-5B2C6884610F (last visited July 24, 2015); see also City Renews Efforts to Redevelop 
Kingsbridge Armory, CITYLAND (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.citylandnyc.org/city-renews-
efforts-to-redevelop-kingsbridge-armory. Mayor Bloomberg sued the Council claiming the law, 
which required developers and their tenants to pay employees ten dollars per hour plus $1.50 
per hour in a “health benefits supplement,” would hinder job creation and industry growth. 
Nick Gardner, NYC Mayor Says ‘Living Wage Law’ Is Preempted and Invalid (N.Y.Sup.Ct.), 
WESTLAW LAB. & EMP. DAILY BRIEFING, Dec. 18, 2013, 2013 WL 6645414. Mayor Bill de Blasio, 
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core principle of most CBA campaigns is a desire that jobs (with living 
wages), as well as other benefits, be offered to residents in 
neighborhoods surrounding the development first.72 
2.     Equitable Development and Economic Justice 
As the number and frequency of CBA campaigns increases 
nationwide, CBAs are increasingly seen as the cost of doing business for 
major development projects.73 The primary arguments supporting 
CBAs include a range of perspectives that advance concepts of equity 
and justice.74 The overwhelming goal of community groups in 
negotiating CBAs is fighting poverty.75 One study indicated that 
“economic justice” was the number one community goal in negotiating 
a CBA.76 
It is a primarily goal of this Article to assess the extent to which 
CBAs actually achieve equitable development, and if so, equitable to 
who? This Article will return to the notion of equitable development in 
the case studies in Part II, as well as in the analysis in Part III. 
E.     Arguments Against CBAs 
There are several arguments against CBAs, or at least arguments 
suggesting strong caution in widely adopting CBA negotiation 
procedures. CBA criticisms range from the rhetorical, which are 
typically made by politicians who would prefer that CBAs not exist, to 
 
who took office in January 2014, dropped the lawsuit in March 2014; de Blasio, who had backed 
off previous campaign promises to expand the Act to apply to more workers, recently signed an 
executive order expanding the Act. Andrew J. Hawkins, Mayor to Tenants at City-Backed 
Projects: Pay Up, CRAIN’S: INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/
20140930/BLOGS04/140939987/mayor-to-tenants-at-city-backed-projects-pay-up; Rachel L. 
Swarns, Silence from de Blasio on Expansion of Living Wage Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/07/nyregion/silence-from-bill-de-blasio-on-living-wage-
law.html?_r=0. 
 72 Been, supra note 8, at 18. 
 73 Fazio & Wallace, supra note 1, at 543. In 2008, one article provided a comprehensive 
national survey of CBAs in Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, Oakland, New York, New Haven 
(Connecticut), Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Denver, Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C., Camden (New 
Jersey), New Orleans, and elsewhere. See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Negotiating for Social 
Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies of Current and 
Developing Agreements, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 113 (2008). 
 74 Musil, supra note 20, at 837. 
 75 Id. at 846. 
 76 Id. 
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the scholarly, which often focus on instances involving state action. This 
Section highlights major concerns with CBAs in the literature. 
1.     Claims of Extortion by Community Groups 
One of the harshest rhetorical criticisms of CBAs came from 
former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg. Despite signing a 
2005 CBA related to the development of the Barclays Arena at Atlantic 
Yards77 as a witness, Mayor Bloomberg’s opinion changed as of 2009 
when he referred to CBAs simply as a “small group of 
people . . . feather[ing] their own nests, extort[ing] money from the 
developer.”78 Bloomberg’s position was further clarified by then 
president of the New York City Economic Development Corporation, 
Seth Pinsky, who indicated that the objection was to the private nature 
of CBAs as functioning outside the political process, preventing elected 
officials from ensuring “communities get the benefits that they need.”79 
The critique of CBAs as outside the political process, and therefore 
beyond control of duly elected representatives of the people, is perhaps 
the most harming. Since community groups themselves are unelected 
their motives can be called into question.80 This Article will assess this 
argument in greater detail in Part III. 
2.     Lack of Representativeness 
Perhaps related to the extortion argument is the fact that 
occasionally, CBA coalitions do not represent community interests. 
Since CBA coalition negotiators are not elected,81 community members 
have limited established mechanisms—save going to the press or 
 
 77 Now termed “Pacific Park Brooklyn.” Pacific Park Brooklyn, FORESTCITY, http://
www.forestcity.net/properties/mixed_use/property_listing/Pages/Pacific_park_brooklyn.aspx 
(last visited July 24, 2015). 
 78 Mike McLaughlin, Bloomy Still Wants Gehry—Plus Other Tidbits from the Mayor in Our 
Endorsement Sit-Down, BROOKLYN PAPER (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.brooklynpaper.com/
stories/32/34/32_34_mm_bloomberg_in_our_office.html (quoting Michael Bloomberg). 
 79 Norman Oder, On Brian Lehrer Show, NYC EDC’S Pinsky Avoids AY CBA Discussion, 
Misrepresents Railyard, and Claims He Lives “a Few Blocks” from the Site, ATLANTIC 
YARDS/PACIFIC PARK REP. (Jan. 12, 2010, 2:53 AM), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/
2010/01/on-brian-lehrer-show-nyc-edcs-pinsky.html (quoting Seth Pinsky). 
 80 In the Atlantic Yards CBA, for instance, the signatory groups had a direct financial 
interest in the CBA moving forward. Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban Redevelopment 
Policy, Judicial Deference to Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards 
Project, 42 URB. LAW. 287, 316 (2010). 
 81 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 11; Been, supra note 8, at 21. 
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leveraging their own political power—for holding negotiators 
accountable for the outcomes of CBA negotiations, or for negotiators’ 
conduct during the negotiation.82 
3.     Corruption by Elected Officials and Impermissible State Action 
When private CBA negotiations impact public approvals, there are 
many opportunities for impermissible state action—and worse.83 
Political decisions are rife with opportunities for self-dealing. 
Government decisions, including those related to land use, are often 
corrupted by insider deals.84 
CBAs are susceptible to government involvement when elected 
officials or government agents attempt to enter into CBAs as parties. 
Even if not acting as parties, government officials can use their power 
and office to steer lucrative benefits to nonprofits that they direct or 
control, often via family members or supporters.85 Directing benefits to 
particular groups favored by government officials is contrary to the 
transparent and inclusive nature of CBAs. 
With government involvement comes the legal doctrinal trappings 
of state action. Although the “essential nexus”86 and “rough 
proportionality”87 tests may not directly apply to CBAs as private 
agreements, CBAs are seen against the backdrop of Supreme Court 
 
 82 Been, supra note 8, at 21–22. 
 83 Further examples include when governments pass legislation supporting or opposing 
certain community benefits, or adopting their own CBA without community input. See, e.g., 
Ted Phillips, Hempstead Residents Rally Against Downtown Redevelopment, NEWSDAY (Apr. 18, 
2015, 9:49 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/hempstead-residents-rally-
against-downtown-renaissance-1.10294356?pts=915712. 
 84 This becomes evident when entrenched factions are brought down with indictments and 
the political landscape shifts. Nick Reisman, Corruption Probes Hamper Deal Making, DeFran 
Says, ST. POL. (June 8, 2015, 2:56 PM), http://www.nystateofpolitics.com/2015/06/corruption-
probes-hamper-deal-making-defran-says. In one instance, a “secret benefits agreement” was 
reportedly negotiated around the development of the Gateway II shopping complex in the East 
New York neighborhood. Erin Durkin & Jake Pearson, Charles Barron Backs Brooklyn Complex 
After Developer Vows Cash for Ex-Aide’s ‘Confidential’ Plan, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 7, 2011, 
4:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/charles-barron-backs-brooklyn-
complex-developer-vows-cash-ex-aide-confidential-plan-article-1.160819. Allegedly, a former 
aide of a city councilmember was the sole signer of an agreement that was not made public, 
which provided a cash payout to a coalition represented by a single negotiator. Id. 
 85 See, e.g., Durkin & Pearson, supra note 84. 
 86 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that there must be an 
essential nexus between conditions the government imposes during a land use approval and the 
proposed development). 
 87 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding the impact of a proposed 
development must be roughly proportional to the government’s conditions set for a specific 
land use approval). 
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jurisprudence regulating negotiations over land use approvals.88 This 
Article will revisit state action in Part III by assessing the success of CBA 
negotiations in avoiding government interference. 
F.     CBA Campaigns Shape Major Economic Development Projects 
1.     Detroit City Council Considers CBA Ordinance 
In Detroit, the City Council considered an ordinance that would 
have required CBAs between community groups and developers for 
development projects estimated to cost over fifteen million dollars in 
public or private funds, receiving public land, or receiving cumulative 
tax abatements over three hundred thousand dollars.89 Such CBAs 
would have been a requirement for a project receiving public approval.90 
First-source hiring programs, a mechanism to recruit and train local 
workers for construction and operations job, would have been required 
for projects under three million dollars.91 
The proposed Detroit bill borrowed largely from recommendations 
made in the literature, and from two reports released in New York City 
in 2010.92 First, the bill required developers to negotiate with the “Host 
Community,” defined as residents within the census tract where the 
development is located, or in adjacent census tracks.93 As some have 
correctly observed, when developers approach communities as equals, 
there is the potential for a win-win scenario.94 
The bill also follows in part the recommendations of a 2010 report 
by the New York City Bar’s Land Use Committee, in which the authors 
recommended that city officials consider CBAs only in economic 
development projects, and not in land use approvals.95 The Land Use 
Committee argued that, were government to consider CBAs in the land 
use process, it might run afoul of constitutional protections afforded 
 
 88 Been, supra note 8, at 14–15. 
 89 See READ! The Current Draft CBA Ordinance, EQUITABLE DETROIT COALITION, http://
www.equitabledetroit.org/read-the-current-draft-cba-ordinance (last visited Apr. 22, 2016).  
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
 93 READ! The Current Draft CBA Ordinance, supra note 89. 
 94 See, e.g., DLA Piper Press Release, supra note 18. 
 95 See LAND USE COMM., ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., THE ROLE OF 
COMMUNITY BENEFIT AGREEMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY’S LAND USE PROCESS 47–48 (2010), 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071844-TheRoleofCommunityBenefit
AgreementsinNYCLandUseProcess.pdf. 
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developers.96 The Detroit ordinance, as was proposed, suggested that 
CBAs be considered in economic development projects, or in projects 
involving land disposition.97 
Following the NYC Bar report, NYC Comptroller John C. Liu 
commissioned his own report, which advocated “public benefit 
agreements” in both land use approvals and in economic development 
projects (1) with footprints greater than five hundred thousand square 
feet, and (2) receiving in excess of seventy-five million dollars.98 The 
comptroller’s report recommended that public benefits commitments be 
included in public approvals and enforceable by the city and its 
economic development agency.99 This is in contrast to the proposed 
Detroit ordinance that would have kept CBAs enforceable by the 
community groups that are parties to the agreement.100 Importantly, the 
proposed ordinance was limited in that developers would not have been 
required to sign a CBA, but only to engage with the community for a 
CBA negotiation.101 Nevertheless, the proposed ordinance was not 
supported by all Detroiters. 
Rodrick Miller, president and CEO of the Detroit Economic 
Growth Corporation has argued that requiring CBAs only raises 
barriers to attracting new businesses to the city.102 This is consistent 
with the two primary arguments against the ordinance: First, that 
requiring developers to enter into a CBA will discourage them from 
building in Detroit. And second, that the city’s challenges are best solved 
by economic growth.103 But critics of these arguments claim that CBAs 
are critical in sharing benefits that were missed during the development 
 
 96 Id. at 46–48; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 97 READ! The Current Draft CBA Ordinance, supra note 89. 
 98 TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC BENEFIT AGREEMENTS, supra note 65. 
 99 Id. 
 100 READ! The Current Draft CBA Ordinance, supra note 89. 
 101 DAVID WHITAKER, LEGISLATIVE POLICY DIV., CITY COUNCIL, CITY OF DETROIT, 
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS POLICY DEBATE (2014), http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/
0/docs/Legislative%20Policy%20Reports/2014/Community%20Benefits%20Agreement%2010-
14-14_1.pdf?ver=2014-10-15-145656-547. 
 102 Ryan Felton, Report: Community Benefits Ordinance Not ‘Absolute Requirement’ for 
Development to Sign Agreement, DETROIT METRO TIMES: NEWS HITS (Oct. 17, 2014, 1:23 PM), 
http://www.metrotimes.com/Blogs/archives/2014/10/17/report-community-benefits-
ordinance-not-absolute-requirement-for-development-to-sign-agreement. 
 103 See, e.g., Eli Day, Opinion, Community Benefits Agreements Make Economic Sense, 
DETROIT NEWS (Apr. 30, 2015, 12:08 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2015/
04/30/day-community-benefits-agreements/26595573. 
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of the Detroit Red Wings arena104 and the international bridge crossing 
into Canada.105 
While city council members in Detroit considered the merits of the 
proposed legislation, lawmakers in the Michigan state legislature 
preemptively prohibited aspects of the ordinance that raised wages for 
workers. In particular, the Michigan legislature recently passed, and the 
governor approved, the controversial House Bill No. 4052, known as the 
Local Government Labor Regulatory Limitation Act.106 The Act 
prohibits local governments from enacting a wage ordinance (such as a 
living wage law) that exceeds the minimum wage in Michigan.107 Of 
course, the legislature cannot prevent a CBA coalition and a private 
developer from agreeing to a living wage at a particular site. 
Nevertheless, requiring state approval for a living wage ordinance is 
clearly designed to stop the movement to a fifteen dollars per hour 
minimum wage, which has recently been passed in Los Angeles, Seattle, 
and other cities.108 
2.     New Atlanta Falcons Stadium Rises Despite CBA Campaign 
When construction of the Georgia Dome was completed in 1992, it 
was the largest domed stadium in the world.109 It cost $214 million to 
build,110 is owned by the State of Georgia, and has hosted home games 
for the National Football League’s (NFL) Atlanta Falcons, the National 
Basketball Association’s (NBA) Atlanta Hawks for a time, the Georgia 
State Panthers, the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) 
Football Chick-fil-A Peach Bowl, and the Southeastern Conference 
Football Championship.111 In 2010, the Georgia World Congress 
Center, the stadium’s operator, released a study that it commissioned in 
 
 104 See, e.g., Ryan Felton, The Unexpected Politician: Raquel Castañeda-López, DETROIT 
METRO TIMES (June 10, 2015), http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/the-unexpected-politician-
raquel-castaandntildeeda-landoacutepez/Content?oid=2349311. 
 105 See, e.g., Alexis Stephens, Detroit Is Taking the Lead in the Community Benefits 
Movement, NEXT CITY (Mar. 10, 2015), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/detroit-community-
benefits-agreement. 
 106 H.R. 4052, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015). 
 107 Id. 
 108 For news about the fifteen dollar per hour minimum wage campaign, see Latest News, 
15NOW.ORG, https://15now.org/latest-news (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
 109 About the Georgia Dome, GA. DOME, http://gadome.com/about/Default.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2016). 
 110 Georgia Dome, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/buildingbig/wonder/structure/
georgia.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
 111 About the Georgia Dome, supra note 109. 
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order to build a new stadium to replace the Georgia Dome.112 The 
Falcons management expressed a preference for a new stadium versus 
renovating the Georgia Dome.113 
In March 2013, the Atlanta City Council approved $200 million in 
tax exempt stadium construction bonds for the project, paid for by hotel 
and motel taxes, plus an undefined hundreds of millions more to defray 
maintenance and operations through 2050.114 In May 2013, the NFL 
agreed to loan $200 million for stadium construction.115 Architectural 
plans for the new stadium include room for around 70,000 seats, 180 
luxury suites, and 7500 club seats, at an estimated cost of $1 billion.116 
In June 2013, Common Cause Georgia attempted to gain the 
35,000 signatures necessary under the Atlanta City Charter to bring a 
ballot question of whether or not to back the $1 billion dollar project. 
They were unsuccessful in the petition drive.117 
In March 2014, a local church was demolished to make way for the 
new stadium construction.118 In May 2014, there was groundbreaking 
on the new site.119 By January 2015, it was announced that the new 
stadium would have a digital screen three times larger than any existing 
single board display in the NFL.120 It would have a 100-yard bar and a 
circular roof opening inspired by the Roman Pantheon.121 Public 
 
 112 POPULOUS, GWCC: MASTER PLAN PHASE II—STADIUM SOLUTIONS: FINAL REPORT 
(2010), http://www.gwcc.com/about/stadium/Reports/Master%20Plans/mpreport2.pdf. 
 113 Tim Tucker, Fans Pay the Price for New Stadiums, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 27, 2012, 
4:49 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/fans-pay-the-price-for-new-stadiums/nQT7T. 
 114 CITY OF ATLANTA, NSP FINANCING PROPOSAL: PROPOSED NEW STADIUM PROJECT AND 
HOTEL/MOTEL TAX (2013), http://www.atlantaga.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?
documentid=7191. 
 115 NFL Grants $200 Million Loan for New Atlanta Falcons Stadium, NAT’L FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE (May 21, 2013, 1:07 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000204938/article/
nfl-grants-200-million-loan-for-new-atlanta-falcons-stadium. 
 116 Mercedes-Benz Stadium, STADIUMS PRO FOOTBALL, http://stadiumsofprofootball.com/
future/MercedesBenzStadium.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).  
 117 Jim Galloway, Common Cause Concedes Defeat in Petition Drive to Stop Falcons Stadium, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST.: POL. INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.ajc.com/weblogs/
political-insider/2013/aug/08/common-cause-concedes-defeat-petition-drive-stop-f. 
 118 Michelle E. Shaw, First of Two Churches Demolished for New Falcons Stadium, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST. (Apr. 24, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/first-of-two-churches-
demolished-for-new-falcons-s/nfhJf. 
 119 Tim Tucker, At Stadium Groundbreaking, Blank Lobbies for a Super Bowl, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (May 19, 2014, 11:07 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/sports/football/at-stadium-
groundbreaking-blank-lobbies-for-a-supe/nfzg3. 
 120 Tim Tucker, Falcons Hire Firm to Build NFL’s Largest Video Board, ATLANTA J.-CONST. 
(Jan. 30, 2015, 5:15 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/sports/football/falcons-hire-firm-to-build-
nfls-largest-video-boar/nj2DH. 
 121 Marissa Payne, Check Out the Atlanta Falcons’ New, Ridiculously Cool Stadium, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2015/01/13/check-
out-the-atlanta-falcons-new-ridiculously-cool-stadium. 
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financing commitments were increased to $554 million.122 Personal seat 
licenses were offered for sale at up to $45,000.123 The Chick-fil-A Peach 
Bowl has already said it will bid to host the College Football Playoff once 
the stadium is built, and the 2020 NCAA Men’s Basketball Final Four is 
already scheduled to take place at the stadium.124 
In summary, the city and state made an almost $600 million public 
financing commitment for construction, and undetermined sums for 
maintenance and operations for the next thirty years. Yet nowhere is 
there an enforceable agreement stating how the money will be spent, 
and whether any of the procurement, jobs, or revenue will benefit local 
residents. Indeed the one effort to put the question of whether to 
publically finance the stadium to a public vote was abandoned.125 Had 
there been a CBA negotiation, one might conjecture, it may have looked 
like one of the CBA negotiations that resulted in binding agreements. 
II.     THE 2013 KINGSBRIDGE NATIONAL ICE CENTER CBA: ANALYSIS AND 
LESSONS LEARNED 
Following in large part the strategies discussed above and 
implemented by organizers in Atlanta, Chicago, and elsewhere, the 
Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance, staffed at the time by the 
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC),126 
waged a CBA campaign that led to a binding agreement around the 
$345 million renovation of a building that takes up three city blocks and 
could house nearly two football fields side-by-side.127 The 2013 
 
 122 Neil deMause, Falcons Stadium Cost to Taxpayers, Counting Hidden Subsidies: $554 
Million, FIELD SCHEMES (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.fieldofschemes.com/2013/03/18/4735/
falcons-stadium-cost-to-taxpayers-counting-hidden-subsidies-554-million. 
 123 Doug Richards, Falcons: Seat Licenses Start at $500, Up to $45,000, 11 ALIVE (June 2, 
2015, 5:55 PM), http://www.11alive.com/story/news/local/downtown/2015/06/02/falcons-seat-
licenses/28372491. 
 124 Atlanta Selected to Host 2018 College Football Playoff National Championship, CHICK-
FIL-A PEACH BOWL (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.chick-fil-apeachbowl.com/2015/11/04/2018ncg; 
New Atlanta Stadium to Host 2020 NCAA Final Four, MERCEDES-BENZ STADIUM (Nov. 14, 
2014), http://mercedesbenzstadium.com/2014/11/14/new-atlanta-stadium-to-host-2020-ncaa-
final-four. 
 125 Galloway, supra note 118. 
 126 NWBCCC was incorporated as a New York not-for-profit corporation in August 1974. 




(last visited Apr. 22, 2016). 
 127 Laura Flanders, After 20-Year Fight, Bronx Community Wins Big on Development Project 
Committed to Living Wages and Local Economy, YES! MAG. (Jan. 3, 2014), http://
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Kingsbridge National Ice Center (KNIC) CBA can be viewed from the 
perspective of a variety of interest groups, including community 
organizers, developers, government officials, and private citizens. This 
Part poses and discusses several key questions, including: Who gets to 
negotiate CBAs? What is the appropriate value of the benefits agreed to? 
And are community groups the best parties to be negotiating CBAs with 
developers? 
This Part presents examples of how successful CBA negotiations 
and campaigns happen, focusing on the Kingsbridge Armory example, 
while alluding to others. The KNIC CBA involved many of the issues 
discussed above regarding co-option by government, and the CBA is 
still being implemented. Nevertheless, it can serve as an important guide 
to future CBA negotiations. Thus far, a study of the KNIC CBA is 
missing from the legal academic literature. This Article fills that gap. 
A.     The KNIC CBA 
Located in the Kingsbridge neighborhood of the Bronx,128 the 
Kingsbridge Armory129 is part of a revival movement of armory 
construction in New York City.130 The armory became city owned in the 
 
www.yesmagazine.org/commonomics/kingsbridge-armory-community-benefits-agreement 
(stating that the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition founded Kingsbridge 
Armory Redevelopment Alliance); Zoe Rosenberg, See Inside the Colossal Abandoned 
Kingsbridge Armory, CURBED N.Y. (June 9, 2015, 3:10 PM), http://ny.curbed.com/2015/6/9/
9951688/see-inside-the-colossal-abandoned-kingsbridge-armory (stating that the project was 
estimated at $345 million, covers nearly three city blocks, and the drill floor is the size of two 
football fields). 
 128 The Bronx derives its name from Jonas Bronck, of Danish ancestry, who arrived in the 
area in 1639. See Jared Tobin Finkelstein, Commentary, In re Brett: The Sticky Problem of 
Statutory Construction, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 430, 430 n.3 (1983) (citing 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
AMERICANA 599 (1968 ed.)). 
 129 Officially the home of the 258th Field Artillery (Eighth Regiment), the Kingsbridge 
Armory was designated a landmark site on September 24, 1974, by the New York City 
Landmarks Preservation Commission. The Commission describes the armory as having been 
built over a five-year period, from 1912 to 1917, and designed by the firm Pilcher & Tachau, 
which also designed the Troop C Armory at 1579 Bedford Avenue in the Crown Heights 
neighborhood of Brooklyn in 1901. “[O]ne of the few remaining armories in New York 
City, . . . it gives the appearance of a medieval Romanesque-style fortress with its massive 
towers and crenellated parapets . . . .” LANDMARKS PRES. COMM’N, N.Y.C., KINGSBRIDGE 
ARMORY (EIGHT REGIMENT ARMORY) (1974), http://
www.neighborhoodpreservationcenter.org/db/bb_files/74-KINGSBRIDGE-ARMORY.pdf. In 
1974, the Landmarks Preservation Commission regarded it as the largest armory in the world. 
Id. 
 130 Robert Koch, The Medieval Castle Revival: New York Armories, J. SOC’Y ARCHITECTURAL 
HISTORIANS, Oct. 1955, at 23. 
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1990s and sat vacant for years.131 This Section discusses two attempts to 
redevelop the armory. It highlights the KNIC CBA reached between the 
Kingsbridge National Ice Center Partners and a broad-based 
community coalition led by the Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment 
Alliance (KARA), a community organizing group. The case study 
analyzes the KNIC CBA negotiation process, the substance of the 
agreement, and draws lessons from both that can help build a legal 
framework for assessing the usefulness of CBAs in land use approvals. 
1.     Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance 
NWBCCC is a grassroots organizing group known for its Saul 
Alinsky-modeled community organizing methodology.132 “Organizing” 
for Alinsky means three general principles: winning immediate 
improvements in people’s lives, giving people a sense of their own 
power and altering the relations of power.133 NWBCCC brought this 
organizing approach to the redevelopment of the Kingsbridge Armory 
when it launched KARA.134 
KARA is the first truly inclusive grassroots CBA coalition in New 
York City.135 The KARA campaign to shape the development of the 
Armory had initially started around 1997 after the city of New York 
took ownership of the building.136 KARA’s activities included outreach 
 
 131 Following the announcement of the redevelopment of the armory in 2013, Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg said: “What is now an abandoned structure will soon become the world’s 
largest indoor ice rink facility . . . and it will serve as yet another example of our 
administration’s commitment to turning what were once symbols of New York City’s 
decline . . . into community treasures and international attractions.” Winnie Hu, City Council 
Approves an Ice Center for the Bronx, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/12/11/nyregion/city-council-approves-an-ice-center-for-the-bronx.html?_r=0 (quoting 
Mayor Bloomberg). 
 132 Julissa Reynoso, The Impact of Identity Politics and Public Sector Reform on Organizing 
and the Practice of Democracy, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 150 (2005). Since the 1940s, 
community organizing has been linked with Saul Alinsky. Id. at 153 (citing Scott L. Cummings 
& Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 461 
(2001)). 
 133 Id. at 153 (citing KIMBERLEY A. BOBO ET AL., ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: 
MIDWEST ACADEMY MANUAL FOR ACTIVISTS 11–12 (3d ed. 2001)). 
 134 Telephone Interview with Alice McIntosh, Lead Negotiator, Kingsbridge Armory 
Redevelopment All. (Dec. 18, 2014). “NWBCCC . . . collaborated with the United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT); the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Employees Union (RWDSU); 
and the Carpenters and the Laborers Union to start an Armory Committee to” present the 
community’s ideas for renovation of the Armory. Reynoso, supra note 132, at 182 n.191 (citing 
NW. BRONX CMTY. & CLERGY COAL., FINAL REPORT TO THE ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND 13 
(2002) (on file with author)). 
 135 Salkin & Lavine, Balancing Community Empowerment, supra note 19, at 210. 
 136 Telephone Interview with Alice McIntosh, supra note 134. 
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to congregations in the neighborhoods surrounding the armory, as well 
as direct actions, such as candlelight vigils, protests, and direct meetings 
with city officials.137 
2.     The Related Companies’ Failed CBA Attempt 
In 2008, the city selected The Related Companies to redevelop the 
Armory into a $310 million retail mall, including shops, restaurants, and 
a movie theater.138 Following selection, KARA demanded The Related 
Companies agree to a CBA prior to final approval of the project by the 
City Council.139 Then Mayor Michael Bloomberg and then president of 
the city’s Economic Development Corporation publically opposed 
KARA’s demand.140 
One of the more divisive terms among the community coalition 
was the proposal to exclude a grocery store from the proposed 
development.141 KARA sought to block a supermarket or grocery store 
in the project plan, while the chairman of the local Community Board142 
asked that the project include a grocery store.143 
 
 137 Id. 
 138 LAND USE COMM., supra note 95, at 22; Terry Pristin, Bronx Groups Demand a Voice in a 
Landmark’s Revival, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at C6. 
 139 Bill Egbert, Coalition Battles Kingsbridge Armory Developer over Community Benefits, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 24, 2008, 11:24 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/
coalition-battles-kingsbridge-armory-developer-community-benefits-article-1.279649 (“The 
Kingsbridge Armory was built to serve and protect our community . . . . Let’s make it a beacon 
of hope once again.”(quoting Desiree Pilgrim-Hunter, one of the leaders of KARA)); Pristin, 
supra note 138. 
 140 Terry Pristin, Proposed Supermarket Divides Bronx Community, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 
2009, at B6; Daniel Beekman, Bloomberg Sits Down with CNG, BRONX TIMES (Aug. 27, 2009), 
http://www.bxtimes.com/stories/2009/35/doc4a96911003b49524387239.html. 
 141 Salkin & Lavine, Balancing Community Empowerment, supra note 19, at 210 (pointing 
out that some members of the KARA coalition did not want a grocery store included in the 
development, while others felt that a grocery store was a necessary service that the 
neighborhood was lacking). Subsequently, a family-owned, Bronx-based company opened an 
approximately 10,000 square foot grocery store with an entrance across the street from the 
armory site. See Our Locations, MORTON WILLIAMS, http://www.mortonwilliams.com/#!our-
locationa/c1sa7 (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) (listing a 15 E. Kingsbridge Road location in the 
Bronx). 
 142 Community boards in New York City have an advisory role in land use decisions under 
the City’s Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP). See N.Y.C., N.Y., CHARTER ch. 8, 
§ 197-a (2015). Borough presidents also have an advisory role; the City Planning Commission 
has a vote; and ultimately, the City Council decides whether or not a project will proceed. 
Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), N.Y.C. DEP’T CITY PLAN., http://
www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/applicants/applicant-portal/step5-ulurp-process.page (last visited 
July 25, 2015) (illustrating the ULURP process). 
 143 Terry Pristin, Proposed Supermarket Divides Bronx Community, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 
2009, at B6. 
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The wages that tenants at the project would be required to pay their 
employees was a divisive issue, not amongst the coalition members, but 
between the coalition and the developer. KARA, Bronx Borough 
President Ruben Diaz Jr., and others called for a “living wage” to be paid 
to all employees at the redeveloped armory.144 Jesse Masyr, attorney for 
The Related Companies, called the living wage proposal a deal killer.145 
On December 14, 2009 the City Council voted down the project 
proposal of The Related Companies.146 This was the first time in the 
twelve years of the Bloomberg Administration that the Council rejected 
a Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) proposal.147 The 
Council went on to pass the Fair Wages for New Yorkers Act, over 
Bloomberg’s veto, requiring a higher living wage be paid for projects 
receiving subsidies from the City.148 New York City Mayor de Blasio has 
increased the living wage in the legislation to the symbolic $13.13 per 
hour149 by executive order.150 
 
 144 Bill Egbert, Bronx Leaders Demand Living Wage at Kingsbridge Armory Development 
Even if it Scuttles Deal, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 27, 2009, 1:53 AM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/bronx-leaders-demand-living-wage-kingsbridge-
armory-development-scuttles-deal-article-1.399130. 
 145 Sam Dolnick, Planners Accept Proposal for Mall at Bronx Armory, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 
2009, at A28 (“We’re opposed to imposing an economic penalty to tenants that come to our site 
that doesn’t exist literally across the street or anywhere else in New York City.” (quoting Jesse 
Masyr)). 
 146 Sewell Chan, Council Spurns Plan to Turn Kingsbridge Armory into Mall, N.Y. TIMES: 
CITY ROOM (Dec. 15, 2009, 8:54 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/council-
spurns-plan-to-turn-kingsbridge-armory-into-mall. For a discussion on KARA persuading the 
Council to vote no on the project as a success of the checks and balances of the City Charter, 
see Michael A. Cardozo, Reflections on the 1989 Charter Revisions, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 85, 89 
(2014). 
 147 Sally Goldenberg, A Bronx Bummer, N.Y. POST (Dec. 15, 2009, 5:00 AM), http://
nypost.com/2009/12/15/a-bronx-bummer (discussing the blow to Bloomberg in halting one of 
his hoped for projects, as well as Bronx Borough President Ruben Diaz Jr.’s push for a ten 
dollar per hour minimum wage plus benefits). Diaz Jr.’s position at the time was the idea “that 
any job is better than no job no longer applies.” Id. (quoting Diaz Jr.). Masyr stated that “the 
council ‘voted no to over 2,000 jobs,’” and questioned the Council’s rationale since the 
Council’s Land Use Committee based its no vote on traffic and parking concerns. Id. 
 148 See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE tit. 6, § 6-134 (2015); see also supra note 71. 
 149 Perhaps this mirrors President Obama’s minimum wage raise for federal contractors to 
$10.10 per hour. See Ben Wolfgang, Because He Says So: Acting Alone, Obama Boosts Minimum 
Wage for Contractors, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2014/feb/12/obama-raise-minimum-wage-1010-hour-federal-contrac. 
 150 Matt Flegenheimer, De Blasio’s Executive Order Will Expand Living Wage Law to 
Thousands More, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/nyregion/
de-blasio-to-sign-executive-order-significantly-expanding-living-wage-law.html. 
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3.     A Successful CBA for the Kingsbridge National Ice Center 
Following the defeat of the 2009 proposal, Diaz Jr. and Council 
Member Fernando Cabrera cochaired a task force to study 
redevelopment models for the armory.151 Desirée Pilgrim-Hunter, 
President of NWBCCC, was a member of the committee working on 
this report, along with Majora Carter, newly elected State Senator 
Gustavo Rivera, Community Board Chair Paul Foster, and Partnership 
for New York City President Kathy Wylde. The task force report, issued 
in June 2011, studied three uses for the armory: sports, wellness, and 
entertainment center; sustainable food industry; and film studio.152 
On January 12, 2012, the New York City Economic Development 
Corporation released a new request for proposals (RFP) to redevelop the 
armory.153 The RFP took many of the task force report 
recommendations into account. It encouraged developers to submit 
proposals for recreation, community facility, and entertainment uses, as 
well as commercial and retail uses, while discouraging residential and 
big-box store uses.154 The RFP also stated it would view favorably 
proposals that maximized jobs falling under Local Law 38 of 2002, 
which requires contractors and subcontractors doing business with the 
city to pay employees at least ten dollars per hour with health benefits, 
or $11.50 per hour without health benefits.155  
 
 151 KINGSBRIDGE ARMORY TASK FORCE, KINGSBRIDGE ARMORY TASK FORCE REPORT (2011), 
http://bronxboropres.nyc.gov/pdf/Kingsbridge-Armory-Task-Force-Report.pdf. 
 152 Id. (specifying a hockey rink and other uses, such as a field house, in the section on 
sports, wellness, and entertainment). 
 153 City Renews Efforts to Redevelop Kingsbridge Armory, supra note 71; see also N.Y.C. 
ECON. DEV. CORP., REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS: KINGSBRIDGE ARMORY (2012), https://
www.scribd.com/doc/85645468/Kingsbridge-Armory-Request-For-Proposals-2011-FF-1-11-12. 
In contrast to the 2006 RFP, which The Related Companies had responded to and had been 
selected from, this RFP entertained options to lease, as well as to purchase, the site. City Renews 
Efforts to Redevelop Kingsbridge Armory, supra note 71. 
 154 City Renews Efforts to Redevelop Kingsbridge Armory, supra note 71. 
 155 Local Law 38 of 2002 is an early living wage law passed by Mayor Bloomberg that 
extended a living wage primarily to home healthcare and childcare workers employed by 
agencies with city contracts. Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Mayor Bloomberg Signs 
New York City Living Wage Law (Nov. 27, 2002), https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/
mayor-bloomberg-signs-new-york-city-living-wage-law; see also File No. Int 0066-2002, N.Y.C. 
COUNCIL, http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=437415&GUID=
621101D0-2EBF-468B-9E13-DF9AFBDA66BB&Options=ID|Text|&Search=2002%2f038 (last 
visited May 11, 2016). The New York City Council has expanded the living wage law over the 
past decade into what is now called the Fair Wages for New Yorkers Act, which was enacted 
June 28, 2012. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE tit. 6, § 6-134 (2015); see also supra note 
71. As this article goes to publication, the future of the Kingsbridge National Ice Center project 
is uncertain, as the KNIC team and the New York City Economic Development Corporation 
are engaged in an open dispute about whether KNIC satisfied the conditions to receive its lease 
to the armory. Charles V. Bagli, Bronx Ice Center Plan Hangs in the Balance, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
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A group led by National Hockey League all-star Mark Messier 
proposed to build nine ice rinks inside the Kingsbridge Armory to be 
called the Kingsbridge National Ice Center.156 The proposal reflected 
many of the terms in the RFP, including living wage jobs, a general local 
hiring provision, and green building practices.157 The KNIC team also 
began an aggressive, targeted, media and outreach effort, which 
included obtaining the endorsement of Diaz Jr.,158 as well as courting 
KARA leadership.159 
KARA formed a partnership with Bronx Community Board 7 in 
advocating for a CBA.160 KARA and the developer, led by Kevin 




 156 Matt Chaban, How Exactly Do You Cram Nine Ice Rinks into a 95-Year-Old Armory, 
Even One as Big as Kingsbridge, OBSERVER (Aug. 8, 2012, 2:40 PM), http://observer.com/2012/
08/how-exactly-do-you-cram-nine-ice-rinks-into-a-95-year-old-armory-even-one-as-big-as-
kingsbridge; see also Redevelopment of Kingsbridge Armory, NW. BRONX COMMUNITY & 
CLERGY COALITION, http://northwestbronx.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Cooperation-
Agreement-Kingsbridge-Armory-CBA.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) [hereinafter KNIC CBA]. 
 157 KNIC CBA, supra note 156. 
 158 Chaban, supra note 156; Winnie Hu, Ice Center with 9 Rinks Is Proposed for Bronx 
Armory, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/nyregion/ice-center-
proposed-for-kingsbridge-armory.html?_r=0. 
 159 Telephone Interview with Alice McIntosh, supra note 134. KNIC and KARA leaders even 
toured the Ed Snider Foundation ice sports program in Philadelphia. Id. Ed Snider is chairman 
of Comcast Spectacor, which owns the Philadelphia Flyers National Hockey League Team, and 
other companies, including Global Spectrum, which manages events facilities. Founder, SNIDER 
HOCKEY, http://sniderhockey.com/who-we-are/founder (last visited Apr. 11, 2016). 
 160 Community Board 7 and Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance Partner to 
Negotiate Community Benefits Agreement, NORWOOD NEWS (Dec. 20, 2012) [hereinafter 
NORWOOD NEWS], http://www.norwoodnews.org/id=10014&story=community-board-7-and-
kingsbridge-armory-redevelopment-alliance-partner-to-negotiate-community-benefits-
agreement (reporting that the community board and KARA released a joint statement sharing 
their goals that an enforceable CBA is signed and that the community’s priorities are contained 
in the lease signed with the city). 
 161 In October 2014, a judge in the Bronx ruled that Kevin E. Parker is the sole member of 
the Kingsbridge National Ice Center LLC—the entity that was selected to redevelop the 
armory—and could continue to negotiate a lease with the City of New York. David Cruz, Judge: 
KNIC Project Can Proceed, NORWOOD NEWS (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.norwoodnews.org/id=
15916&story=judge-knic-project-can-proceed. Mark Messier, National Hockey League all-star 
and former New York Ranger, also participated in the discussion. Mike Sielski, ‘The Captain’ 
Quits the Rangers, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2013, 8:42 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000
1424127887323873904578571902630546868. Messier, who had sought the Rangers’ coaching 
position, left the organization in June 2013 to assist in the development of KNIC and to expand 
the game of hockey in the New York area. Id. Sarah Hughes, Olympic figure skater, also 
participated in the discussion. Neil Best, Sarah Hughes Developing World’s Largest Indoor Ice 
Rink in the Bronx, NEWSDAY (Feb. 13, 2014, 12:55 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/
olympics/sarah-hughes-developing-world-s-largest-indoor-ice-rink-in-the-bronx-1.7059462. 
 162 David Cruz, CBA Talks for Kingsbridge Armory Bid Underway, BRONX TIMES (Jan. 31, 
2013), http://www.bxtimes.com/stories/2013/5/05_armory_2013_01_31_bx.html (discussing 
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By April 2013, it was speculated that the city would designate a 
developer to redevelop the armory.163 
After months negotiating terms, on April 17, 2013, twenty-five 
member organizations of KARA and the developer signed an 
enforceable CBA.164 The CBA was called the first of its kind in New 
York City, one that will provide generations of Bronx residents with 
shared economic development benefits.165 Soon thereafter, then Mayor 
Bloomberg designated KNIC to redevelop the armory into the largest 
ice sports complex in the world.166 
The numbers in the selected project are impressive. The 750,000 
square foot ice center would house nine regulation-size rinks for skating 
and hockey, including a 5000 seat arena.167 It is expected to cost at least 
$350 million,168 create 267 permanent jobs,169 and 890 temporary 
construction jobs.170 
The voluntary agreement signed between KNIC and almost thirty 
community groups171 is equally impressive. KNIC promised to pay 
every worker a living wage of at least ten dollars per hour with health 
 
efforts between KARA and KNIC to reach a settlement on the terms of a community benefits 
agreement). 
 163 Tanyanika Samuels, Decision Imminent in Fate of Kingsbridge Armory, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Apr. 22, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/decision-imminent-
fate-kingsbridge-armory-article-1.1322131. 
 164 KNIC CBA, supra note 156. The author, who was counsel to the KARA coalition during 
the CBA negotiation process with KNIC, prepared execution drafts of the CBA, and the signing 
process is based on personal recollection and review of the final draft of the KNIC CBA. 
 165  DLA Piper Press Release, supra note 18 (“I have closely followed attempts to negotiate 
community benefits agreements in New York City over the past ten years, and this is the first 
credible CBA in the City. Congratulations to KARA and everyone involved. I have every 
expectation that this agreement will deliver real economic benefits for the surrounding 
communities. KARA and the developer have shown again that when developers and 
communities come together as equals, everyone wins.” (quoting Julian Gross)). 
 166 Jennifer H. Cunningham, Bronx Community Board 7 Sets Aside Opposition to Approve a 
Massive Ice Palace at the Former Kingsbridge Armory, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18, 2013, 8:31 
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/bronx-community-board-okays-ice-
skating-palace-article-1.1459218; Winnie Hu, Plan for Ice Center in Bronx Armory Moves 
Forward, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/nyregion/
bloomberg-announces-ice-sport-center-proposal-for-bronx-armory.html.  
 167 Hu, supra note 166. 
 168 Sally Goldenberg, Mark Messier Tussles with Mayor over Cuomo Funding for Kingsbridge, 
POLITICO N.Y. (Mar. 28, 2016, 5:28 AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-hall/
2016/03/8594957/mark-messier-tussles-mayor-over-cuomo-funding-kingsbridge. 
 169 Hu, supra note 166. Permanent jobs might include full-time equivalent positions, which 
actually involve multiple employees working part-time schedules. KNIC CBA, supra note 156, 
at A-3. 
 170 Hu, supra note 166. The cost of securing the support of elected officials, including Diaz 
and others, was substantial, as city lobbying records indicate that KNIC paid lobbying firm 
James F. Capalino & Associates $197,500. Id. 
 171 Hu, supra note 166.  
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benefits, or $11.50 without benefits.172 These wages are pegged to the 
Consumer Price Index and will increase annually.173 KNIC will give 
hiring preference to Bronx residents.174 
Further, KNIC will lease to the coalition, rent-free, almost 50,000 
square feet of community space in the armory for ninety-nine years, 
contract with minority and women-owned businesses, and give ice 
skating time to public school children in surrounding neighborhoods.175 
There are also detailed provisions in the agreement addressing green 
building standards, such as installing water bottle filling fountains, and 
providing water bottles to youth who participate in programs.176 
After the designation, the armory project was supported by Bronx 
Community Board 7,177 Diaz Jr.,178 the City’s Planning Commission,179 
and ultimately, the City Council.180 Almost a year later, in October 2014, 
 
 172 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-8. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at A-9. 
 175 Id. at 6, A-11, A-18, A-20; Hu, supra note 131; Hu, supra note 158. 
 176 See KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-12 to -17. 
 177 Cunningham, supra note 166. Following a public hearing at Lehman College, the full 
Board voted twenty to five in favor of the project. Testifying at the hearing about the CBA that 
KARA and KNIC entered into, Pilgrim-Hunter stated that “[w]e have set a new standard, 
across the country, for how development will be done in low-income communities.” Id. 
 178 Sarina Trangle, Armory Ice Center Barrels Through ULURP, RIVERDALE PRESS (Sept. 25, 
2013), http://riverdalepress.com/stories/Armory-ice-center-barrels-through-ULURP,53022. 
Diaz’s office recommended the KNIC project be approved on September 20 at a hearing that 
highlighted the $1.7 billion in shared economic development coming from the community 
benefits agreement, and the Landmarks Preservation Commission approved the plan later that 
day. Id. 
 179 Chris Pomorski, Ice, Ice Baby: City Planning Commission Approves Plan to Convert Bronx 
Armory to Ice Skating Mecca, OBSERVER (Nov. 6, 2013, 5:52 PM), http://observer.com/2013/11/
ice-ice-baby-city-planning-commission-approves-plan-to-convert-bronx-armory-to-ice-
skating-mecca (summarizing the Commission’s unanimous vote to approve the project, and 
Messier’s, Bloomberg’s, and others’ excitement at the project progressing). 
 180 The Council has a practice of deferring to the local council member in whose district a 
given project is being voted on. See, e.g., Press Release, Helen Rosenthal, Council of the City of 
N.Y., Land Use Committee Approves TF Cornerstone Proposal for 606 West 57th Street (Apr. 
24, 2014), http://helenrosenthal.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/220128366-Press-Release-
Land-Use-Committee-Approves-TF-Cornerstone-Proposal-for-606-West-57th-Street-April-
24-2014.pdf. In this case, Cabrera was won over by additional funds to address traffic and 
parking issues. See Hu, supra note 131. Cabrera’s motives were under scrutiny as it came to 
light that, during negotiations, he had unsuccessfully demanded KNIC pay $100,000 per year 
for ninety-nine years to a nonprofit called Community Action Unlimited, which was associated 
with Mr. Cabrera’s New Life Outreach International. Id.; see also Jennifer H. Cunningham, 
Councilman Dodges Allegations He Tried to Secure Money from Kingsbridge Armory Developer, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 25, 2013, 9:29 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/
councilman-icy-answer-article-1.1528967; Gustavo Rivera Beats Fernando Cabrera in 
Democratic State Senate Primary, NEWS 12 BRONX (Sept. 10, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://
bronx.news12.com/news/gustavo-rivera-beats-fernando-cabrera-in-democratic-state-senate-
primary-1.9274846. 
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KNIC entered into a ninety-nine-year lease with the city of New York 
for the armory.181 
4.     KNIC CBA Challenges and Next Steps 
As of this writing, there is an approved project to redevelop the 
armory. The project has achieved a unique trifecta of (1) private 
commitment from KNIC, (2) government approval from the legislative 
and executive branches of the city government,182 and (3) consensus 
among the organized community groups and institutions that the 
project should proceed as proposed and according to the CBA.183 There 
is also a private CBA between KNIC and the KARA coalition, sharing 
economic gains over nearly the next 100 years.184 The following are the 
challenges that all parties faced achieving a CBA, difficulties they will 
face in moving forward on the project, and how that particular CBA 
contributes to the legal academic scholarship about CBAs generally. 
a.     A Redevelopment Eighteen Years in the Making 
When the City took over the armory in 1996, the City, the Bronx, 
and the Kingsbridge neighborhood were much different than they are 
now.185 Crime rates have a correlation to urban depopulation, which, 
since 1996, has reversed as rates have fallen and the City’s population 
has risen.186 In 1996, the city was only starting to convey residential city-
 
 181 Joe Anuta, Kingsbridge Armory Project Skates Past Obstacle, CRAIN’S (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20141016/REAL_ESTATE/141019922/kingsbridge-
armory-project-skates-past-obstacle. Signing the lease had been held up by litigation brought 
by Jonathan Richter, Marcus Wignell, and Jeff Spiritos, which was cleared when a Bronx judge 
ruled against the three men. Id. Also announced in 2014 was a thirty million dollar equity 
investment by Michigan-based Kresge Foundation. Id. 
 182 The statute of limitations to challenge the project approval in court through an Article 78 
action in New York Supreme Court, the State’s trial court, lapsed 120 days after the Council’s 
approval in December 2013. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (MCKINNEY 2008); see also LAW OFFICES OF 
KEVIN P. SHEERIN, UNDERSTANDING ARTICLE 78 (2014), http://civilservice.sheerinlaw.com/
files/2014/06/sheerinlaw.com-Article_78_eBook.pdf. No lawsuits were filed. 
 183 There has been no organized opposition to the project, and any opposition to the project 
has been unserious and unreasoned. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 166. 
 184 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at 6. 
 185 Crime rates in 1996 were dropping from their peaks, though there were still 515 murders 
reported during the first six months of 1996. See Clifford Krauss, 1996 Data Show Crime Rates 
Are Still Falling in New York, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/03/
nyregion/1996-data-show-crime-rates-are-still-falling-in-new-york.html. In contrast, only 333 
murders were reported in all of 2014. POLICE DEP’T OF N.Y.C., SEVEN MAJOR FELONY OFFENSES 
(2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/seven_major_
felony_offenses_2000_2014.pdf. 
 186 Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences of 
Cities, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 159 (1999); Michael Howard Saul, New York City Population Hits 
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owned property for redevelopment as affordable housing.187 The 
economic development projects of Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s 
administration were focused on redeveloping 42nd Street, and sports 
team stadiums.188 Commercial development of city-owned property, 
especially in low-income neighborhoods, was not high on the city’s 
economic development agenda at the time. 
Nevertheless, the KARA coalition formed in 1996 to shape the 
redevelopment of the armory as a community space.189 It took seventeen 
years of advocacy, organizing, negotiating, testifying, and volunteering 
to build a credible community coalition that a developer could take 
seriously.190 It also required the KARA coalition to organize against the 
2009 proposal of The Related Companies to build up the power and 
support it needed to negotiate and win the 2013 KNIC CBA. Going 
forward, there are many new obstacles to clear, including obtaining 
private financing, and keeping KNIC accountable for promises made. 
b.     KNIC Finances the Project and Resolves Internal Disputes 
From the developer’s perspective, they still face a plethora of 
market-based challenges. KNIC must convince investors to contribute 
equity in the project. Several high profile investors have already made 
equity investments.191 But KNIC still needs to raise additional equity, 
and to secure construction loans from lenders willing to take a risk on 
this atypical development project. KNIC’s business model relies on 
 
Record High, WALL ST. J.: METROPOLIS (Mar. 27, 2014, 3:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
metropolis/2014/03/27/new-york-city-population-hits-record-high. 
 187 Directory of New York City Affordable Housing Programs, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR. FOR 
REAL EST. & URB. POL’Y, http://furmancenter.org/institute/directory/entry/third-party-transfer-
program (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (detailing the Third Party Transfer Program that the NYC 
Department of Housing Preservation and Development created in 1996). 
 188 A Timeline of the Block, NEW 42ND STREET, http://www.new42.org/about/
redevelopment-timeline.aspx (last updated Apr. 2016); see also Charles V. Bagli, Despite 
Criticism, Giuliani Pursues Ballparks as Economic Catalysts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2000), http://
www.nytimes.com/2000/03/02/nyregion/despite-criticism-giuliani-pursues-ballparks-as-
economic-catalysts.html. 
 189 Telephone Interview with Alice McIntosh, supra note 134; Breaden Thompson, 
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition, PREZI (July 8, 2013), http://prezi.com/
s6bfatpjut72/untitled-prezi. 
 190 Redevelopment of Kingsbridge Armory, NW. BRONX CMTY. & CLERGY COALITION, http://
northwestbronx.org/what-we-do/k-a-r-a (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
 191 Joe Anuta, Kingsbridge Armory Ice Center Nets $30M Infusion, CRAIN’S (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20140812/REAL_ESTATE/140819966/kingsbridge-
armory-ice-center-nets-30m-infusion. The investment, less than ten percent of the $350 million 
needed to redevelop the armory, includes a market-rate investment from the Kresge 
Foundation. Id.; see also Michael Buteau, Messier-Led Bronx Ice Center Gets $4 Million Bauer 
Investment, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-08-18/messier-led-bronx-ice-center-gets-4-million-bauer-investment. 
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“contract ice,”192 which will generate their business plan claims, as well 
as revenue sufficient to cover debt service and to pay investors.193 It also 
must resolve outstanding financial claims from Richter, Spiritos, and 
Wignell.194 
c.     KARA Coalition Decides How to Build Out and Program 
Community Space 
The KARA coalition also faces challenges moving forward. It has to 
continue to use its power to influence the benefits won in the CBA. For 
instance, it must develop a consensus on building out and programming 
the almost 50,000 square feet of community space.195 The coalition must 
also develop a proposal of its own to equitably divide space, charge 
rents, and use funds from rents for community uses that the coalition 
approves.196 All these administrative tasks take resources and buy in 
from the groups within the coalition. 
With much work done, and much more to come, what can be 
learned from the 2013 KNIC CBA to both improve outcomes of the 
development at the Armory, and in other economic development 
projects nationally? The next Section begins to address this question. It 
analyzes the KNIC CBA from the perspectives of the community 
coalition and of the developer. 
B.     Analysis of the KNIC CBA 
The KNIC project has been approved, and the time to challenge the 
City Council’s approval of the Mayor’s designation of the KNIC to lead 
the project has passed.197 This Section analyzes the agreement viewed 
from both sides of the transaction. It also addresses the agreement from 
the perspective of the public, which is not a party to the agreement. 
 
 192 “Contract ice” refers to ice rink time that is contracted for certain periods of time for 
various athletic endeavors (e.g., figure skating and amateur or professional hockey teams). 
 193 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at Exhibit D. 
 194 Cruz, supra note 161. 
 195 Cabrera, and even de Blasio, have mentioned a hip hop museum being included in the 
space, but the coalition itself, which controls the use of the space, has not yet taken a public 
position on how the space will be used. Shant Shahrigian, Birth of Hip Hop to Be Honored with 
New Museum at Armory, RIVERDALE PRESS (Mar. 19, 2014), http://riverdalepress.com/stories/
Birth-of-hip-hop-to-be-honored-with-new-museum-at-armory,53951; see also Michael 
Howard Saul, Mayor de Blasio Takes Questions in Google Hangout, WALL ST. J.: METROPOLIS 
(Apr. 11, 2014, 1:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2014/04/11/mayor-de-blasio-takes-
questions-in-google-hangout. 
 196 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-19, § 11. 
 197 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (MCKINNEY 2008); supra note 182. 
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1.     Is the 2013 KNIC CBA a Good Deal for the Community? 
The first goal of the KARA coalition was to secure an enforceable 
agreement. With respect to this goal, KARA was successful.198 But the 
question remains: Did the community negotiate a good deal? 
a.     Valuing the 2013 KNIC CBA 
One estimate of the overall benefits to the community contained in 
the agreement is $1.7 billion.199 This estimate presumably factors in both 
cash and in-kind contributions from the developer to the community 
through the KARA coalition over the ninety-nine year term of the CBA. 
For example, the developer will provide specific dollar amounts of 
benefits through the agreement. 
These defined dollar amount benefits include an initial 
contribution of eight million dollars in capital toward developing and 
building out the community space.200 Section 3(a)(ii) of the Community 
Benefits Program has a $10,000 per year scholarship for ninety-nine 
years for residents of the northwest Bronx to become accredited in 
operating a geothermal and/or solar power system at the Armory. 
Section 3(a)(v) includes a $250,000 fund for establishing and 
administering a grant program for local businesses to make capital 
improvements.201 
There is a so-called “run rate contribution” of $1,000,000 per year, 
adjusted by the consumer price index, that the coalition can use to 
purchase in-kind services, such as ice rink or classroom rentals, from 
the developer.202 Section 3(c) outlines a revenue contribution where the 
developer pays $250,000 in the first year of the project, and going 
forward pays 1% of gross ice rink rental revenue up to $25,000,000, and 
2% of gross ice rink rental revenue above $25,000,000.203 For example, if 
gross ice rink rentals are $26,000,000 in a given year, KNIC contributes 
$250,000, or 1% of $25,000,000, plus an additional $20,000, or 2% of 
$1,000,000. 
There are also certain benefits the developer agreed to that do not 
have a definite dollar value assigned. For these benefits, some are easier 
to assign a dollar value than others. For example, section 11 contains a 
Community Space Lease term where the developer agrees to lease two 
 
 198 DLA Piper Press Release, supra note 18 (quoting Julian Gross). 
 199 Trangle, supra note 178. 
 200 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-5, § 3(a). 
 201 Id. at A-5, §§ 3(a)(ii), 3(a)(v). 
 202 Id. at A-6, § 3(b). 
 203 Id. at A-6 to -7, § 3(c). 
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areas on subterranean floors to the coalition for one dollar for ninety-
nine years.204 One can assign a rental value to this space based on an 
escalating dollar per square foot amount. 
Other terms, like paying workers a living wage above the minimum 
wage, can also be assigned a dollar amount based on the current 
minimum wage.205 Yet, other terms are more difficult to assign a 
definite dollar value, though they have clear value for the community. 
Section 6 requires that 51% of permanent workers are hired from the 
local population so that local residents get priority access to jobs.206 
Section 7 requires that 25% of all contractors hired during project 
construction are Bronx-based minority and women-owned businesses, 
with 25% of the project’s construction workers coming from local 
neighborhoods.207 Section 8 requires the developer to meet certain green 
building targets,208 and section 10 requires a Local Procurement Plan 
ensuring that between 25% and 51% of project goods and services are 
purchased from local businesses.209 It is more difficult to assign a 
definite dollar value to these requirements. 
b.     Risk Factors for the Community 
It is possible that KNIC never intends to perform under the 
contract and entered into it only to obtain the project’s approval. The 
protection to the community coalition, however, is that the remedy 
agreed to in the CBA is not money damages—it is specific 
performance.210 Presumably, should KNIC not perform, one of the 
members of the coalition can compel performance with a breach of 
contract claim under New York law. KNIC could plead government 
coercion as a contract defense; however, given the private nature of the 
 
 204 Id. at Exhibit B (showing the community space on floor SL1 and SL2). 
 205 Id. at A-8, § 4. 
 206 Id. at A-9 to -11, § 6(c). 
 207 Id. at A-11 to -12, § 7(a). 
 208 Id. at A-12 to -17, § 8. 
 209 Id. at A-17 to -19, § 10. 
 210 Id. at 6, § 5(d). The remedy in CBAs is often specific performance instead of money 
damages in order to avoid both the developer, and the community coalition, not honoring their 
end of the bargain. See, e.g., Index of Docs, LAW OFF. JULIAN GROSS, http://juliangross.net/docs/
CBA/Staples_Cooperation_Agreement.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (follow “CBA/” 
hyperlink; then follow “Stapes_Cooperation_Agreeement.pdf” hyperlink); Index of Docs, LAW 
OFF. JULIAN GROSS, http://juliangross.net/docs/CBA/Hunters_Point_Agreement.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2015) (follow “CBA/” hyperlink; then follow “Hunters_Point_Agreeement.pdf” 
hyperlink). With money damages there is also the risk that the community coalition will be 
seen to have been bought out. 
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agreement and the valuable consideration it received, such a defense is 
unlikely to withstand scrutiny.211 
At this moment, the greatest risk to the community coalition is if 
KNIC fails to raise the money it needs to move forward with the project. 
If KNIC fails to finance the project, the promised benefits would not be 
delivered. The coalition would need to renegotiate with any subsequent 
developer. 
Another risk is that KNIC might decide that it wants to withdraw 
from the project entirely. To limit the risk to the coalition in the event of 
a withdrawal, section 6(c) of the Cooperation Agreement has a cooling 
off period of five years before KNIC can resubmit a proposal to develop 
the Armory in the event of a withdrawal. This term is designed to guard 
against a strategic withdrawal and reapplication by KNIC in order to 
avoid its obligations in the CBA. 
Other risks come both from inside and outside of the coalition. 
From the inside, there is risk that one or more coalition members will 
not be able to survive to enforce the agreement. This risk is minimized 
by the fact that any or all of the twenty-five members can enforce all 
terms of the agreement.212 With twenty-seven decision makers, it is 
likely that there will be disputes among dissenting parties. However, this 
risk is minimized by having a strategic leadership committee, and an 
open consensus decision-making model. 
From outside the coalition, individuals and groups are already 
trying to influence how the community space is used. Council member 
Cabrera held a press conference with supporters of a hip hop museum 
to call for space within the armory for the museum.213 While it is up to 
the coalition to decide how the space is used, Cabrera, or others, might 
continue to push the coalition members in one direction or another. 
Outsiders or internal decision makers might also argue vagueness 
of particular terms for their own ends. While CBAs have not faced court 
scrutiny thus far, it may be the case that a party seeks to enforce a 
particular term through the court process. While this is a risk, it is a 
small one given the care with which the agreement was drafted. 
 
 211 DLA Piper Press Release, supra note 18 (stating the opinion of the two lead attorneys 
working for KARA and an outside CBA expert that the KNIC CBA is credible and will deliver 
benefits to generations of Bronx residents). 
 212 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at 1–2 (defining “Coalition”); c.f. Atlantic Yards Community 
Benefits Agreement, DOWNTOWN BROOKLYN NEIGHBORHOOD ALLIANCE, http://thedbna.org/
atlantic-yards-community-benefits-agreement-2 (last visited Apr. 22, 2016). The coalition 
could not enforce the housing terms once ACORN imploded. Norman Oder, Forest City Seems 
to Be Backing Off Its Pledge to Have 50% of Affordable Apartments Be Larger Units. What Will 
Bertha Lewis Say?, ATLANTIC YARDS/PACIFIC PARK REPORT (Nov. 18, 2011, 8:31 AM), http://
atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2011/11/forest-city-seems-to-be-backing-off-its.html. 
 213 See Shahrigian, supra note 195. 
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2.     Is the 2013 KNIC CBA a Good Deal for KNIC? 
There are two important questions to ask when approaching the 
CBA from KNIC’s perspective: First, what is the actual value of the 
promised benefits? And second, was the bargained for exchange 
adequate to KNIC? So far, this Article has attempted to answer the first 
question. Now, the Article turns to the questions of the adequacy of the 
consideration KNIC received in the transaction, and what it had to 
promise in exchange for that consideration. 
Practically, KNIC succeeded where The Related Companies failed. 
KNIC was able to secure nonopposition from the KARA coalition, 
which almost ensured approval of the ice center project. In obtaining an 
approved project, the 2013 KNIC CBA was 100% successful for the 
KNIC Partners. 
KNIC agreed to a magnitude and duration of community benefits 
never before offered by a developer in New York City.214 As mentioned 
above, the project has continued to attract financier attention despite 
the CBA’s promised benefits. One will know for certain once the project 
moves forward; however, in the short term, it does not appear that the 
CBA has hindered KNIC’s ability to attract investors in the project. 
C.     Concluding Thoughts and Lessons Learned 
The prospect of an ice rink development in the Bronx—let alone 
the largest ice sports complex in North America—tends to be met with 
skepticism. The African American, Dominican, Puerto Rican, and other 
Caribbean backgrounds of the people that make up the Bronx 
communities, particularly in the northwest Bronx, lack a history of ice 
sports involvement. But involving traditionally underrepresented 
communities is only part of the allure of the Kingsbridge National Ice 
Center. The KNIC developers estimate an average of one year round 
indoor ice rink per every 100,000 people—in a city of an estimated 8.3 
million people (1.4 million in the Bronx alone) there should be eighty-
three rinks instead of the current seven year round rinks, and none in 
the Bronx.215 
One result of the approved development has been uncertainty 
among landlords across the street about what to do with their properties 
 
 214 Complaint, KNIC LLC v. N.Y.C. Econ. Dev. Corp., No. 22507/2016E (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 
12, 2016) (No. 22507/2016E), http://www.norwoodnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/
KNIC-Lawsuit-.pdf. 
 215 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at Exhibit D. 
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given the specter of the KNIC development. Landlords have started 
giving tenants of mom and pop retail shops along West Kingsbridge 
Road month-to-month lease renewals, and in some cases sought a fifty 
percent increase in rent.216 Buildings surrounding the site continue to 
command high sales prices. One in particular, boasting ten occupied 
retail storefronts and fifty-seven apartment units, sold recently for 
fifteen million dollars,217 having been sold the year before for only $4.5 
million.218 
It is perhaps logical that the KNIC development might drive real 
estate speculation and increase property values in the neighborhood. 
This result is largely not addressed in the KNIC CBA. While residential 
tenants may benefit from rent regulated apartment units,219 commercial 
tenants have no such protection. 
Mitigating the effects of increased commercial rent and increased 
residential rent for market rate tenants is a challenge. While tax 
increment financing districts capture some of the value of increased 
property prices from landlords,220 no such similar mechanism is easily 
implemented to limit the rents that tenants, both commercial and 
residential, pay.221 CBA coalitions should consider involving 
commercial and residential tenants in CBA negotiations to brainstorm 
and consider alternative strategies for limiting the negative impacts of 
increased rents on existing businesses. The KNIC CBA included a 
$250,000 small business grant program,222 and a “good faith efforts” 
 
 216 Wendy Davis, Rents Shoot Up Across from Kingsbridge Armory, CRAIN’S (Nov. 3, 2014), 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20141103/REAL_ESTATE/311029990/rents-shoot-up-
across-from-kingsbridge-armory. 
 217 David Cruz, Another Property Sold Blocks from Kingsbridge Armory, NORWOOD NEWS 
(June 25, 2015), http://www.norwoodnews.org/id=18408&story=another-property-sold-blocks-
from-kingsbridge-armory. 
 218 Search by Document ID/CRFN, AUTOMATED CITY REGISTER INFO. SYS. (ACRIS), http://
a836-acris.nyc.gov/DS/DocumentSearch/CityRegisterFileNumber (last visited Apr. 22, 2016) 
[hereinafter ACRIS] (search “2014021800080002” in the “Enter the Document ID Number” 
field). 
 219 For a description of the two types of residential rent regulations in New York State, see 
Raymond H. Brescia, Line in the Sand: Progressive Lawyering, “Master Communities,” and a 
Battle for Affordable Housing in New York City, 73 ALB. L. REV. 715, 719–21 (2010). Residential 
rents in rent-stabilized apartments may only be increased by landlords by an amount set by the 
Rent Guidelines Board. Mission Statement, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, http://
www.nycrgb.org/html/about/about.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2015). 
 220 For an explanation about tax increment financing, see JOEL MICHAEL, RESEARCH DEP’T, 
MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING (2014), http://
www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/sstif.pdf. 
 221 MICHAEL, supra note 220. Tax increment financing districts only tax property owners—
any increase in tax revenue from renters must come through increased rents charged by 
landlords. Id. 
 222 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-5. 
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provision to provide technical assistance to businesses with three to five 
employees who might sell goods to the KNIC.223 It is possible that grant 
program funds and technical assistance might address the commercial 
lease negotiation issues. However, thinking through the impact of 
project development on rising commercial rents prior to CBA 
formation is a key lesson learned. 
It remains to be seen how the various parties will work together in 
the Community Advisory Council (CAC). The CAC governance is to be 
determined collectively and cooperatively by CAC members.224 Whether 
and how the CAC can make decisions will largely impact the 
implementation of the KNIC CBA terms. As of this writing, the City’s 
Economic Development Corporation has not released the KNIC lease 
from escrow; however, the Economic Development Corporation 
extended the escrow agreement.225 
III.     THE IMPACT OF CBAS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Part I discussed the existing literature about CBAs, definitional 
issues, and current trends in the CBA movement. Part II presented a 
case study of the 2013 Kingsbridge Armory CBA and assessed its 
significance within the CBA movement. This Part assesses the impact of 
CBAs on economic development through the lens of community 
organizing campaigns and other constituencies, such as taxpayers, 
policymakers, and practitioners. 
This Article proposes a framework for assessing the effectiveness of 
CBAs through four key issues: First, it looks at the extent to which CBAs 
effectively resolve disputes around a project’s approval. To evaluate 
these criteria we shall investigate the extent to which CBAs resolve 
disputes outside of litigation, preapproval, as well as an interpretation of 
the CBA through implementation. 
Second, this Article evaluates the extent to which CBAs enhance 
civic participation in land use approvals. Third, it looks at the ability of 
CBAs to protect taxpayers by valuing a project’s approval and 
negotiating an enforceable set of benefits provided in exchange for that 
value. Fourth, and last, is the success that CBAs have in avoiding state 
action and the trappings of constitutional protections for developers 
 
 223 Id. at A-7. 
 224 Id. at A-2. 
 225 Goldenberg, supra note 168 (stating that the Economic Development Corporation 
spokesperson Anthony Hogrebe expressed willingness to work with the KNIC team). 
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who, this Article argues, tend to need them less than marginalized 
communities in isolated rural or urban areas. 
A.     Avoiding Costly Litigation and the Ability to Solve Problems Prior to 
Project Approval 
Power imbalances between developers and community groups 
frequently result in development moving forward whether or not it is 
opposed. Typically, deals are struck either prior to a project’s approval, 
as is most frequently the case with CBAs, or after a project is approved, 
as in a settlement following litigation. Litigation and the court process 
adds time and expense to an outcome that more likely than not is 
similar to what would be reached through a CBA at the outset. This 
Article argues, therefore, that CBAs, despite their costs and challenges, 
are preferable because they frequently resolve disagreements about 
public project approvals in advance, thus avoiding the costly and time 
consuming court process. 
The ability of a CBA to stand alone without subsequent lawsuits 
speaks to the quality of the CBA at resolving differing positions, while 
CBAs that result in contentious litigation were probably not that good 
to begin with. In other words, one strength of CBAs is that they can be 
judged on their ability to resolve disputes around a project. For example, 
if a CBA is reached, yet there is still significant litigation among 
dissenting parties, it is unlikely that the CBA is effective. On the other 
hand, if a CBA is reached, and only minimal lawsuit activity occurs by 
groups with fringe points of view, it is more likely than not that the CBA 
is truly effective. This Article suggests further study in this area around 
quantitative analysis of dispute resolution activity, including number of 
lawsuits filed, and whether there was a CBA. 
Of course, not all constituent groups will be happy all of the time. 
Nevertheless, CBA processes are useful because they lead to better 
decisions, or at least to the types of decisions that get resolved through 
litigation if there is no CBA, or an unsuccessful CBA negotiation 
process. 
1.     Litigation Activity Surrounding Atlantic Yards 
An example of this analysis is the 2005 Atlantic Yards CBA, which 
has been criticized for its lack of inclusivity within the community 
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coalition.226 Following the CBA’s execution, there were as many as 
thirty-seven lawsuits filed related to the project.227 In addition, in June 
2014, a group called BrooklynSpeaks negotiated an agreement to speed 
up the creation of affordable housing at Atlantic Yards.228 While the 
agreement was not styled as a CBA (i.e., BrooklynSpeaks was not a 
party), the agreement between the developer and the State of New York 
achieved much of the goals advanced by the coalition. 
2.     Lack of Litigation Activity Related to Successful CBA Campaigns 
Federal or state case law on the enforceability of CBAs does not 
exist thus far,229 which perhaps supports the proposition that successful 
CBAs have not needed court intervention. To prove this proposition for 
certain, one should also look at economic development projects without 
CBAs and how they tend to have, or not have, significant litigation. In 
the case of the Willets Point economic development project, where no 
CBA was included in the project approval process, there has been 
chronic litigation related to almost every stage of the project and its 
approvals.230 
The author is unaware of any controversial development that had 
no CBA, but which also had little to no significant litigation. It is 
possible to imagine such a project. However, to appease dissenting 
groups, it is likely that the parties involved spent significant time 
coming to an agreement on terms, such that litigation was unnecessary. 
 
 226 Lavine & Oder, supra note 80, at 316 (asserting that most of the eight groups that 
participated in negotiations were created specifically to sign the CBA, while other established 
groups were excluded). 
 227 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008); Apple v. Atl. Yards Dev. Co., No. 
11-CV-5550 (JG), 2014 WL 5450030 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2014); Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. 
Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010); Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 
(N.Y. 2009); Develop Don’t Destroy (Brooklyn), Inc. v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 942 N.Y.S.2d 
477 (App. Div. 2012); 730 Equity Corp. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 1689/2012, 2014 
WL 2134562 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2014); Heron Realty Corp. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 
No. 1690/2012, 2013 WL 3213086 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 2013); In re N.Y. State Urban Dev. 
Corp., No. 32741/09, 2010 WL 702319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2010); Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal 
Def. Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 825 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 2006). 
 228 The author was counsel to BrooklynSpeaks during this negotiation. 
 229 Been, supra note 8, at 30. 
 230 A recent decision appears to have fatally wounded the redevelopment of Willets Point. 
Avella v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.S.3d 358 (App. Div. 2015); see also Charles V. Bagli, City 
Declines to Fight in Court for Land Deal in Stadium’s Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2015, at 
A19. 
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B.     CBAs Increase Civic Engagement 
CBAs can be an effective way for bringing diverse voices into land 
use approvals. Alejandro Camacho has written a multipart article, titled 
Mustering the Missing Voices, about how current government approval 
processes neglect large swaths of stakeholders in the land use approval 
process.231 This Article draws on Camacho’s research to support the 
argument that CBAs increase civic engagement, which is positive both 
in bringing diverse voices into land use, and in encouraging participants 
in other aspects of civic life. Camacho points out elsewhere that CBAs 
reflect the lack of public engagement in land use approvals due to the 
bilateral nature of land use negotiations.232 
The CBA movement is rooted in the movement for Smart 
Growth.233 Smart Growth proponents advance the idea that 
development should be governed by the three E’s: the economy, the 
environment, and equity.234 A jobs-housing balance, and transit-
oriented development, are key principals for Smart Growth advocates.235 
The inclusion of Smart Growth advocates, labor, and other urban 
constituencies within the CBA movement has meant a more diverse 
group involved in land use decisions as communities organize.236 In the 
field of behavioral psychology, there is support for the conclusion that 
people tend to be more likely to consent to decisions, even if they 
disagree with them, once they have had an opportunity to participate in 
the decision-making process.237 The notion of legitimacy derives from a 
source of shared values or shared consent, and varies from one society 
to the next.238 It is logical that if individuals have an opportunity to 
shape a process, then they are more likely to support the result. 
 
 231 Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for 
Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions: 
Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2005); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the 
Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and 
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions: Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269 (2005). 
 232 Alejandro E. Camacho, Community Benefits Agreements: A Symptom, Not the Antidote, 
of Bilateral Land Use Regulation, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 355 (2013) (arguing that CBAs do not solve 
issues related to land use, however, CBAs are a temporary fix to the current bilateral land use 
regulation scheme). 
 233 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 5. 
 234 Id. at 4. 
 235 Id. at 5. 
 236 Id. at 6. 
 237 Camacho, supra note 232, at 365 & n.63 (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE 
LAW (1990)). 
 238 See, e.g., Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic 
Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 132–33 (2012) 
 
DE BARBIERI.37.5.3 (Do Not Delete)  6/6/2016 2:58 PM 
1816 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 37:1773 
 
One study of CBA participants found that increases in public 
participation on development outcomes ranked highest in ways that 
CBAs improve development.239 In other instances where citizens are 
given the opportunity to participate in public decision making, such as 
deciding how capital budget dollars are allocated, residents from diverse 
communities are shown to participate at higher rates than in local 
elections.240 This includes women, youth, and individuals from 
immigrant communities.241 
While more study is needed in this area as it applies to CBAs, 
evidence strongly suggests that civic participation is a key aspect to 
CBAs’ impact on economic development. As communities organize and 
gain sophistication, more diverse voices are added to the land use 
decision process, which was heretofore the exclusive domain of 
businesses and developers.242 The inclusion of diverse voices yields 
better decisions and more positive impacts on citizens’ lives. 
C.     Protecting Taxpayers 
This Article has argued that CBAs provide a critical function in 
allowing community groups to enforce key terms in development 
projects outside the political process. Elected officials, the argument 
goes, may or may not enforce specific terms of a deal depending on a 
variety of forces. A political check for voters to elect a new 
representative is less effective than simply having community groups 
directly contract as parties to agreements and give them the ability to 
enforce those agreements. 
In existing CBAs, including L.A. Live and Kingsbridge Armory so 
far, community groups are able to enforce CBA terms outside of 
government intervention. Although, CBA terms are often also included 
in relevant development agreements or leases.243 
 
(discussing the work of David Beetham and Jean-Marc Coicaud, specifically that legality, 
shared values, and consent are key to studying legitimacy). 
 239 Musil, supra note 20, at 847. 
 240 ALEXA KASDAN ET AL., URBAN JUSTICE CTR., A PEOPLE’S BUDGET: A RESEARCH AND 
EVALUATION REPORT ON PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN NEW YORK CITY 16 (2014), http://
cdp.urbanjustice.org/sites/default/files/CDP.WEB.doc_Report_PBNYC-cycle3-
FullReport_20141030.pdf. 
 241 Id. at 16–17. 
 242 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 6. 
 243 In the instance of the Kingsbridge Armory CBA, the lease contains the same access terms 
for community groups, thus enshrining the “right to skate” in the commercial lease. Ben 
Kochman, Developer, City Finalize Lease to Turn Vacant Kingsbridge Armory into Ice Center, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 16, 2014, 5:33 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/
developer-signs-lease-kingsbridge-armory-article-1.1977160. 
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By contrast, the development surrounding the new Atlanta Falcons 
Stadium has no such similar community group CBA accountability 
check.244 Taxpayers have no protection to ensure they derived a fair 
bargain given the tremendous public equity invested in the stadium’s 
construction.245 True, one can monitor to see how the thirty million 
dollar Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund and Westside Tax 
Allocation District are spent.246 But there is no agreement governing the 
benefits provided in exchange for the public subsidy spent.247 
Invest Atlanta announced the initial recipients of the Westside Tax 
Allocation District Community Improvement Fund in November 
2014.248 Almost two-thirds of the fifteen million dollar Fund were 
allocated toward construction of 407 apartment units near the stadium 
site, and a mixed-use shopping, hotel, and apartment development.249 It 
appears that the Blank Foundation has hired an experienced 
professional to implement the Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund 
in the area surrounding the stadium.250 
In the case of both funds, taxpayers or community groups are not 
represented at all in decisions made about allocating resources. 
Taxpayers need protection from developers making commitments that 
they fail to adhere to after a project is approved. In the Atlanta example, 
commitments have been made without a binding mechanism to enforce 
those terms. Often, commitments are included in project development 
agreements; however, these agreements may only be enforced by 
governments and are subject to the changing winds of elected office. 
The benefits of a CBA are that the benefits themselves can be enforced 
 
 244 See Rabouin, supra note 11 (stating that the community benefits “plan” was adopted 
without the agreement of any community coalition). 
 245 See deMause, supra note 122 (stating that $554 million in public financing was provided 
without any community benefits beyond the anticipation of jobs and tax revenue that would be 
associated with a new stadium). 
 246 See Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund Background, supra note 12. 
 247 See discussion supra Section I.F.2. 
 248 Collin, Invest Atlanta Announces Funding for Westside Projects, ATLANTA INTOWN (Nov. 
20, 2014), http://www.atlantaintownpaper.com/2014/11/invest-atlanta-announces-funding-
westside-projects. 
 249 Id. Other recipients include a soul food restaurant and an office building’s energy 
efficiency program. Id. 
 250 Our Staff & Board of Directors, ARTHUR M. BLANK FAM. FOUND., http://
www.blankfoundation.org/staff-and-board (last visited July 26, 2015) (“Frank [Fernandez] 
joined the Foundation in January 2014 to lead and implement the Westside Neighborhood 
Prosperity Fund, a program designed to contribute to the transformational revitalization and 
redevelopment of Vine City, English Avenue, Castleberry Hill and other adjacent 
neighborhoods.”). For more information about the Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund 
application process, see Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund—Application Process, ARTHUR 
M. BLANK FAM. FOUND., http://blankfoundation.org/westside-application-process (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2015). 
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directly by the groups that are the intended beneficiaries—outside the 
political process. This is a protection to taxpayers who are supposed to 
benefit from the commitments. It is also a protection to taxpayers who 
saw the project approved with certain commitments. CBAs provide 
enforcement in the event that those commitments are not upheld. 
D.     Avoiding State Action 
As discussed in Parts I and II, CBAs function outside of 
government involvement to (1) permit community groups to directly 
enforce CBA terms, and (2) to avoid constitutional protections afforded 
developers by the Supreme Court. Viewing the success of CBAs in 
avoiding state action is significant in assessing their influence on 
economic development projects. First, if community groups cannot 
enforce CBA terms, it undermines the benefits of CBAs that this Article 
has highlighted. Second, if CBAs involve state action, then the terms 
that can be included in a CBA are arguably significantly limited to what 
has both a “nexus” and “rough proportionality” to the project’s 
approval.251 
This Section begins by analyzing what amounts to state action in 
the case of CBAs. It then considers the practical reality that as soon as a 
developer receives project approval, it is significantly less likely for a 
developer to claim that there was impermissible state action. After 
looking at both factors, we can draw conclusions about the importance 
of avoiding state action in the effectiveness of CBAs in influencing 
economic development projects. 
1.     What Amounts to State Action? 
There is some disagreement in the literature about what might 
constitute state action in a CBA negotiation. Vicki Been on the one 
hand suggests that local governments should not consider CBAs and 
CBA terms in land use approvals in order to avoid unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine issues, or, if CBAs are to be considered, that they 
meet certain standards.252 Been also writes that it may be appropriate for 
government to review CBAs in economic development approvals. 
Developers who do not like the conditions set can simply decline to 
 
 251 See discussion infra Section III.D.2. 
 252 Been, supra note 8, at 31–34. 
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develop the project.253 The New York City Comptroller Report 
recommended that CBAs only be used in major projects with more than 
500,000 square feet of development, on more than twenty-seven acres, 
and receiving an excess of seventy-file million dollars.254 This definition 
and recommendation is consistent with Been’s notion that local 
governments can consider CBAs when economic development subsidies 
are provided.255 
Local government review of CBA terms as part of economic 
development subsidy approval is similar to planned unit development 
(PUD) review. PUD regimes exist in cities including Washington, D.C., 
Baltimore, Boston, and Arlington and Alexandria, Virginia.256 Often in 
PUD review, developers receive a density bonus for approval of a master 
development plan. Developers and elected officials negotiate land use 
approvals all of the time. The difference in the CBA context is that 
community groups can enforce them. Ultimately, this perhaps exposes 
the challenges related to negotiating CBAs more than it does in 
determining state action, or not. 
In the Kingsbridge Amory CBA, was it state action for the council 
member to say that a CBA was necessary in order for him to approve 
the project?257 Was it state action for the community board to form an 
“alliance” with the community coalition, which, arguably led to the 
community coalition obtaining the necessary leverage to negotiate 
terms?258 What about the fact that the principals were negotiating with 
the council member who requested, unsuccessfully, a sum of money for 
an organization connected to him?259 What about the fact that the 
council member’s chief of staff was present in the room during 
negotiations?260 
 
 253 Id. at 34. 
 254 TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC BENEFIT AGREEMENTS, supra note 65, at 24. 
 255 Been, supra note 8, at 35. 
 256 DC ZONING UPDATE: PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT STUDY 34–39 (2007), https://
www.communicationsmgr.com/projects/1355/docs/PUD_Study_FINAL.pdf; Alexandra Croft 
Moravec, An Analysis of Planned Unit Development (PUD) Regulations and Processes in 
Washington, DC: A Development Risk Management Case Study 67–68 (2009) (unpublished 
Masters Project, University of North Carolina). 
 257 See Hu, supra note 131. 
 258 See NORWOOD NEWS, supra note 160. 
 259 See Hu, supra note 131. 
 260 See Cruz, supra note 161. 
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2.     Consequences of State Action 
Depending on how local government land use regulators are 
involved in CBA negotiations, CBAs may encounter Supreme Court 
precedent preventing unconstitutional conditions or exactions.261 
According to the Court, any terms that the government seeks in order to 
permit a development to go forward must have an “essential nexus” to a 
legitimate state interest claimed when rejecting the developer 
proposal.262 The condition must also have “rough proportionality” to 
the extent and impact of the proposed development.263 Monetary 
exactions must also satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality 
conditions set by government.264 
Were CBAs to involve a government setting conditions, which they 
as a rule do not, this line of Supreme Court protections would apply. 
Since local governments should not be conditioning project approval on 
CBA terms, then this analysis is not necessary. It is therefore desirable 
for developers and community groups to negotiate directly through 
CBAs. 
3.     What Is the Likelihood that a Developer Will Raise State Action as 
an Issue After a Project’s Approval? 
CBAs settle disputes. From a practical perspective, it is unlikely 
that a developer will enter into a CBA, obtain project approval, and then 
turn around and claim they were wronged by impermissible 
government action. In the case of a successful approval, a developer 
would be foolish to challenge the administrative decision that granted it 
the right to build. In the case of an unsuccessful approval, the terms 
negotiated in the CBA would be unenforceable since CBA terms are 
conditioned upon the project moving forward. Development projects 
are very costly, even at the preapproval, and recently postapproval, 
stages. Therefore, if a CBA is reached, developers are more likely to 
move ahead with the project instead of attempting to tie themselves up 
in litigation. 
 
 261 Been, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
 262 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
 263 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 264 Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013). 
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E.     Recommendations 
CBA campaigns are currently underway in towns and cities across 
the country, and elsewhere in North America. In addition to the 
examples discussed around the Obama Presidential Library, the Atlanta 
Falcons Stadium, the Somerset County wind farm, and the Kingsbridge 
National Ice Center, there are community benefits debates commencing 
around other projects, including: the Atlanta Braves mixed-use 
development in Cobb County Georgia,265 redevelopment of Union 
Square in Somerville, Massachusetts,266 Buffalo,267 throughout projects 
in Canada, especially Ontario,268 Manitoba,269 the Gateway Real Estate 
Development in Chicago,270 the high-speed rail in Illinois,271 rail station 
redevelopment272 and urban revitalization projects273 in Long Island, 
New York, and projects funded in northwest Indiana,274 Maryland,275 
 
 265 ATLANTA BRAVES, ATLANTA BRAVES MIXED-USE DEVELOPMENT SUMMARY, http://
atlanta.braves.mlb.com/atl/downloads/suntrust-park/mixed-use-fact-sheet.pdf (proposing 
100% privately financed stadium, hotel, and retail complex). 
 266 Union Square Redevelopment, SOMERVILLE, MA, http://www.somervillema.gov/
departments/ospcd/economic-development/union-square-redevelopment (last visited Apr. 23, 
2016). 
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(May 14, 2015), http://artvoice.com/issues/v14n19/news_feature.html. 
 268 John Lorinc, The Plan: Train and Hire Toronto’s Neediest for Six-Figure Jobs. The Catch: 
How to Find Them, GLOBE & MAIL (Apr. 17, 2015, 3:37 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/toronto/the-plan-train-and-hire-torontos-neediest-for-six-figure-jobs-the-catch-how-to-
find-them/article24008225; Sara Mojtehedzadeh, Why the Woodbine Gaming Deal Could Be a 
Pathway to Good Jobs, THESTAR.COM (July 12, 2015), http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/07
/12/why-the-woodbine-gaming-deal-could-be-a-pathway-to-good-jobs.html; Laurie 
Monsebraaten, Groundbreaking Infrastructure Law a Boon for At-Risk Youth, THESTAR.COM 
(June 7, 2015), http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/06/07/groundbreaking-infrastructure-
law-a-boon-for-at-risk-youth.html. 
 269 Avery Zingel, Remote Manitoba First Nation Gets Funding for New Bridges, CBC NEWS 
(Feb. 20, 2015, 8:02 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/remote-manitoba-first-
nation-gets-funding-for-new-bridges-1.2965652. 
 270 La Risa Lynch, West Siders Demand Community Benefits Agreement for New Medical 
District Development, PROGRESS ILL. (July 21, 2015, 2:12 PM), http://progressillinois.com/
quick-hits/content/2015/07/21/west-siders-demand-community-benefits-agreement-new-
medical-district. 
 271 Doug Finke, House Passes Bill to Create High-Speed Rail Oversight Panel, ST. J.-REG. 
(Apr. 24, 2015, 7:09 PM), http://www.sj-r.com/article/20150424/NEWS/150429642. 
 272 Deborah S. Morris, Huntington Station Redevelopment Benefits Agreement Approved; 
Provides Fees for Community Programs, NEWSDAY (Jan. 14, 2015, 9:28 PM), http://
www.newsday.com/long-island/towns/huntington-station-redevelopment-benefits-agreement-
approved-provides-fees-for-community-programs-1.9808783. 
 273 Ted Phillips, supra note 83. 
 274 Lu Ann Franklin, Gary Pastor, Award Nominee, Lives by Motto ‘Never Quit’, TIMES 
(Northwest Indiana) (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/gary-pastor-
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Miami,276 Milwaukee,277 Minnesota,278 New Haven,279 and University of 
California’s Richmond Campus.280 CBAs have the potential to positively 
impact many different communities. This Article makes a couple of 
recommendations for how these communities might approach the CBA 
negotiation process given the KNIC CBA and other examples discussed 
above. 
1.     Protecting Residential and Commercial Tenants from Rising Rents 
As development projects in low-income urban and rural areas 
move forward, land values tend to increase. Existing landowners are 
well positioned to reap the returns of higher land values.281 Tenants, on 
the other hand, subject to the residential and commercial rental 
markets, face the prospect of displacement when land values increase. 
There are several mechanisms that CBAs might implement to 
address this issue. In the KNIC CBA, for instance, there is a “revenue 
contribution” that amounts to profit sharing between the developer and 
the CBA signatories.282 The funds from the revenue contribution 
amount to one percent of gross ice rink rental revenue up to twenty-five 
million dollars, or $250,000, and two percent of gross ice rink rental 
revenue over twenty-five million dollars.283 These funds could be used 
 
 275 Ellison Barber, Minority Business Owners: Casino Bids Bias, WUSA9 (Mar. 20, 2015, 
12:37 PM), http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/local/maryland/2015/03/20/minority-business-
owners-casino-bids-bias/25081185. 
 276 David Smiley, FIU Study: Worldcenter Subsidy Deal Falls Short, MIAMI HERALD (May 4, 
2015, 2:00 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/
article20038665.html. 
 277 Don Walker, Milwaukee Urban League Backs Public Financing for Bucks Arena, J. 
SENTINEL (Milwaukee) (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/milwaukee-
urban-league-backs-public-financing-for-bucks-arena-b99475770z1-298777101.html. 
 278 ALL. FOR METRO. STABILITY, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: GROWING A 
MOVEMENT IN MINNESOTA (2007), http://www.metrostability.org/efiles/CBAREPORT.pdf; 
Eliot Brown, Use of Taxpayer Money for Pro-Sports Arenas Draws Fresh Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 8, 2015, 7:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/use-of-taxpayer-money-for-pro-sports-
arenas-draws-fresh-scrutiny-1425856677?mod=djem_jiewr_PS_domainid. 
 279 Steven M. Seigel , Community Benefits Agreements in a Union City: How the Structure of 
CBAs May Result in Inefficient, Unfair Land Use Decisions, 46 URB. LAW. 419 (2014); Allan 
Appel, Looney Calls for UI to Clean Up English Station, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Aug. 5, 2015, 3:29 
PM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/looney_calls_for_an_
english_station. 
 280 Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, Community Concerned About Gentrification with Proposed 
Richmond Global Campus, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (July 16, 2015), http://www.dailycal.org/2015/
07/16/community-concerned-gentrification-proposed-richmond-campus-major-development. 
 281 ACRIS, supra note 218; see also supra text accompanying notes 217–18. 
 282 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-6 to A-7. 
 283 Id. 
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for tenant organizing work, funding property acquisition for 
community or cooperative use, or in some other manner. 
Of course, the challenges involved in deciding how to allocate these 
funds are manifold. Who benefits, and to what extent? It is possible to 
create cooperative housing or commercial space that can be rented out 
on a lottery system to qualifying individuals. There are examples of real 
estate investment cooperatives in areas such as Minnesota284 and New 
York City.285 CBA funds could be allocated to such programs. 
2.     Consider Jurisdiction-Wide Implications and Fixes 
Municipal government is reluctant to plan on a jurisdiction-wide 
scale.286 Because land use decisions are likely to remain the purview of 
local elected officials,287 CBAs—alongside the law of public land use 
approval—will continue to be the norm for how decisions are made. 
Even if a CBA is not reached for a particular project, CBA campaigns 
alone are changing how developers act in the marketplace. 
The fact that a CBA affects only a single development site is 
inherently limiting. It is difficult to influence jurisdiction-wide policy 
through one off negotiated agreements. Occasionally, CBA campaigns 
may lead to changes in municipal law, as in the adoption of a living 
wage law for city-sponsored developments in New York City.288 
Studying and permitting negotiated CBA terms to bubble up to the level 
of jurisdiction-wide law is one possible outcome of the CBA movement. 
One local government scholar has suggested a way that CBAs can 
work with municipal-wide payment systems to compensate local 
residents who have developments in their neighborhoods.289 David 
Schleicher has proposed a Tax Increment Local Transfer (TILT) 
payment system that combines Tax Increment Financing with Trade 
Adjustment Assistance theory, which is used to negotiate free trade 
deals. Schleicher proposes TILTs as a mechanism to “trade” among 
 
 284 NE. INV. COOPERATIVE, http://www.neic.coop (last visited Jan. 18, 2016). 
 285 NYC REAL EST. INV. COOPERATIVE, http://nycreic.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2016). The 
author is an adviser to this organization. 
 286 The bilateral negotiation model, either through negotiated zoning or through the use of 
development agreements, is the baseline land use approval model in most U.S. states. Camacho, 
supra note 232, at 360. 
 287 The New York City Council, for example, has a practice of deferring to the local council 
member in whose district a given project is being voted on. See supra note 180.  
 288 See supra note 71 (discussing the NYC Living Wage). 
 289 Schleicher, supra note 30, at 1725–32. 
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municipal-wide interests and local opposition groups. TILTs and CBAs 
may work together, he writes, to achieve municipality-wide goals.290 
CONCLUSION 
The question this Article has set out to answer is: Do community 
benefits agreements benefit communities? The answer this Article 
proposes is that community benefits agreements do benefit 
communities—if they are negotiated and implemented in a transparent 
and accountable manner. The Article has come to this answer through a 
case study of the negotiations and execution of the KNIC CBA, and 
through analysis of other projects that lacked a CBA. 
This Article presented a framework for assessing the role of CBAs 
in economic development projects. The framework focused on four 
aspects, including the ability of CBAs to resolve disputes surrounding 
significant development projects, to increase civic participation and 
encourage diverse stakeholder voices in land use approvals, to protect 
taxpayers with a binding enforcement mechanism, and to avoid state 
action and a host of constitutional challenges. Through the lens of this 
framework, it assessed how CBAs actually can and do benefit 
communities. 
Despite this conclusion, it is of course possible to imagine 
situations where CBAs do not benefit communities. Some of these 
situations were mentioned above, while some may be new. It is 
important to understand when CBAs fail to benefit communities. 
CBAs that are not transparently negotiated can lead individuals or 
groups to reap benefits that are limited to benefiting only a small group 
of people and not the community as a whole. One can imagine a 
scenario where a politically connected individual or group negotiates a 
CBA with a developer. It would not be surprising if only those 
individuals or groups benefitted to the exclusion of the broader 
community. In other words, outright theft or graft resulting from a 
corrupt transaction is possible. Such a transfer is bound to have a 
harmful effect on the relevant community. 
Likewise, CBAs that do not solicit community input also run the 
risk of not benefitting the community. Civic participation and public 
engagement are keys to successful CBAs. Failure to solicit feedback or 
ideas from large segments of the community can lead to CBAs that are 
contrary to the interest of the community. 
 
 290 Id. 
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Overly paternalistic CBAs may not benefit communities. That is, 
CBAs with terms that assume a community wants a certain benefit but 
does not specifically investigate whether there is demand for such a 
benefit may be wasteful or ineffective. Avoiding assumptions about 
what benefits a community can avoid this aspect of harmful benefits. 
Similarly, CBA terms may lead to waste or other harmful effects 
because the local infrastructure cannot support the long-term intended 
benefits.291 Considering whether a CBA is the best mechanism to 
distribute benefits is an important step in the economic development 
process. Perhaps more advantageous alternatives exist.292 
CBAs tend to lead to development that increases land value and 
that may then force out long-time residents. CBAs as tools of economic 
development may in fact impede development by furthering 
gentrification and increasing displacement. Balancing the needs of long-
time residents with new arrivals is key to ensuring that CBAs do benefit 
communities. 
The goal of this Article was not to argue that community benefits 
agreements are appropriate in all communities everywhere. Rather, it set 
out to show the situations in which CBAs benefit communities. 
Communities, government, and developers may benefit from 
considering the situations in which CBAs do benefit communities when 
crafting compromises to challenging land use approvals. Land use 
disputes are not likely to magically disappear—and CBAs are not the 
mechanism to achieve total land use harmony. Although, in certain 
cases, CBAs do and will have powerful positive impacts on generations 
of low-income families. 
 
 291 International development projects sometimes rely on assumptions, for example, that 
capital investment in a rural well in an impoverished community will benefit the community, 
while in fact the community lacks the infrastructure to maintain the well. Annie Kelly, Money 
‘Wasted’ on Water Projects in Africa, GUARDIAN: KATINE CHRONICLES BLOG (Mar. 26, 2009, 
9:15 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/katineblog/2009/mar/26/water-projects-
wasted-money. 
 292 Some economists and scholars tout, for instance, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
as an appropriate alternative to direct welfare support. For an explanation of the EITC 
program, see Ann L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based 
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 534 (1995). 
